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Since late 1990s, privatization and deregulation in the South African Electricity supply industry 
(ESI) have gradually been underway. Due to the issues which arose in the international markets, 
such as the case of UK liberalization, the level of market power was underestimated although the 
capacity divestments have been substantial since the early 1990s. Therefore, the deregulation 
process is now at the stage of intensive research and planning. 
  
There are a number of models that are used to investigate the competition in the electricity 
market. They include Bertrand model, Cournot model, Supply function equilibrium model, 
conjectural variations model, etc. These models differ in their modeling methodology and 
assumptions. As the quantity that is produced by independent power producers is a key market 
indicator, the classical Cournot competition under game theory has been often used in modeling 
the case with the existence of transmission constraints to identify strategic behaviors of the 
market participants. However, the classical Cournot model focuses on finding the Nash 
equilibrium as a solution.  In this case, there is a high possibility of mismatch between the supply 
and demand of power. No power producer intends to move away from the Nash equilibrium. The 
participation of demand side and the demand elasticity of power demand are underestimated.  
 
In today’s electricity supply industry, demand side participation is considered an important factor 
that can influence the market performance and output effectively. Demand elasticity shows the 
sensitivity of demand side to the market price, and thus can provide potential adjustment of 
demand in the market.  
 
The purpose of this research is to study the impact of demand elasticity on power producers’ 
market competition output. An analytical model, called “Extended Cournot model” is developed 
in this thesis based on the classical Cournot model. Through the integration with conjectural 
variation model, in which power producers consider both the generation and price level, the 





In the classical Nash Cournot model, capacity withdrawal exists in most cases especially when 
transmission constraint occurs. In contrast, the newly developed analytical model ensures that 
demand is always satisfied at all time. Demand elasticity is incorporated directly into the market 
results calculation instead of using the market clearing price. This approach enables the load 
demand to directly obtain the market results by tuning its demand elasticity. The intention is to 
show that demand side should be more encouraged to participate in the market competition. In 
the classical economic dispatch, the load demand is highly inelastic. From the load curve, there is 
only a change of physical volume of demand. The demand responsiveness, which is represented 
by demand elasticity, has been understated.  
 
In this thesis, the hypothesis is that demand elasticity and system constraint have critical 
influence on the power producers’ competition results in terms of market clearing price, 
individual output and profit. Load demand can make use of demand elasticity to affect its final 
payment to the market. Such ability is expected to be limited in the case where system 
constraints, i.e. generation limits and transmission limits, exist. For simplicity, a small network 
and number of power producers are used in this thesis to investigate the effectiveness of the 
Extended Cournot model. However, this model can be applied to more complex networks with 
different market environments.  
 
In order to compare the different impact of load demand’s influence on market competition, the 
market results are calculated based on two cases, i.e. change of physical load demand with 
constant demand elasticity and change of demand elasticity with constant physical load demand. 
In each case, three scenarios as described below were modeled:  
1) without generation or transmission constraints,  
2) with generation constraints, and  
3) with generation and transmission constraints.  
 
Therefore, in total six case studies were conducted to analyze the combined impact of demand 
elasticity and system constraints on power producers’ market results together with load payment. 




The market indicators used for the investigation include: 
 Market clearing price 
 Power producers’ output 
 Power producers’ profit 
 Load payment 
 
To investigate the impact of the change in demand elasticity on the marginal change of price and 
power producers’ quantity, additional two indicators are considered: 
 Derivative of market clearing price over demand elasticity 
 Derivative of individual production over demand elasticity 
 
In the case of change in total demand, the results show that change in total quantity does not 
affect market price, in the scenario without constraints. In contrast, market clearing price is 
determined by the total quantity in the traditional Cournot model. However, the price will change 
when generation and transmission constraints reach a certain extent. This is mainly due to the 
fact that the supply of the most economical power producer’s capability to supply the load 
demand is diminished due to the above constraints. Any additional demand will be allocated to 
the less economical power producer with high marginal cost. For the same reason, power 
producers’ profits and load payment will increase when constraints are introduced. 
 
To validate the above hypothesis, simulations were performed in this thesis. The analytical 
model is validated by comparing its results to the results obtained using an industrial electricity 
market simulation tool, known as “Plexos”.  
 
Plexos has the options to include demand elasticity to model Cournot competition. Plexos also 
allows to introduction generation and transmission limits in its input date session. Both the 
analytical model and Plexos simulation use the Nash Cournot competition approach. The 
simulation results show that the analytical model and Plexos software package are in agreement. 




For some of the simulated scenarios, such as the one with both generation and transmission 
constraints, there are variations in the results between the analytical model and Plexos output. 
The discrepancies in the results are mainly caused by the variations of input data assumptions in 
the modeling of load demand.  
 
It is shown that the assumptions on marginal costs have significant influence on the power 
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1.1 Competition in the electricity market 
 
The electricity supply industry has been undergoing continuous deregulation over the 
last twenty years. During this restructuring process, the exercise of market power has 
been found in a number of electricity markets [1]. Market power is usually defined as 
a market supplier that owns the ability to drive the price above the competitive level, 
or control output for a significant period of time. The exercise of market power 
creates inefficiencies in both resource production and allocation. The most common 
effects of market power include less production in the market which results in lower 
consumption, and higher price levels compared to marginal cost. One of the main 
threats of market power is diminishing consumer surplus which transfers social 
benefits from the consumers to the suppliers [1].  
 
Many methods have been developed to assess market power, such as Lerners index 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI index) [1, 2]. More recent research studies 
have raised the concern of lack of market dynamics in the above indices. It has been 
found in many studies that generators are more likely to exercise market power within 
the presence of potential network constraints [3, 4].  
 
According to the market mechanism, the electricity markets have been defined by two 
main models: the PoolCo model and the Bilateral model [1, 3]. The PoolCo model is 
more centralized, in which the independent system operator determines the economics 
of dispatch and maintains system security. The Bilateral model is a decentralized 
mechanism in which the market determines the economic dispatch and electricity 
price. A hybrid model, which is a combination of the PoolCo and Bilateral models, 
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has also been suggested as a solution to complement the central dispatch with bilateral 
contracts [1].  
 
It is found that generators have more potential to behave strategically in the PoolCo 
model compared to the Bilateral model. The strategic behavior can be modeled 
through imperfect competition using game theory. Previous research has shown that 
generators can influence the transmission constraints and market price with their 
generation output decisions [2, 3, 4, 5]. 
 
1.2    Game theoretical approach in modeling electricity 
competition 
  
The basic strategies for generators to play in a market include price, quantity, and 
supply function. Under the regulations, any explicit price increase by generators will 
be very sensitive and might be penalized by the system operators or regulators. On the 
other hand, changing the generation supply curve is more implicit and less likely to be 
detected. The most usual theory used to analyze price and quantity gaming and 
competition in electricity markets is game theory [6].  
 
In game theory, a pricing game is usually defined as a Bertrand game, and a quantity 
game is defined as a Cournot game. Players in the Bertrand game will usually raise 
their bids above their marginal costs. For the classic Bertrand model, there are a 
number of assumptions as follows [7]: 
   
1) Product homogeneity and identical unit costs.  
2) No capacity constraints.  
3) Generation Companies (GenCos) choose price simultaneously.  
4) Competitors have the incentive to undercut each other’s prices vigorously, 




However, when network constraints exist, Generation Companies may not choose to 
price at a competitive level. Therefore, it is believed that the nature of the above 
assumptions may affect market equilibrium significantly. In the case of high demand 
together with the existence of significant constraints, Cournot competition is often 
used to predict power producers’ behavior [7].  
 
The classic Cournot model of competition enables the power producers to compete 
against each other with quantity strategies. The assumptions under classic Cournot 
competition are as follows [7]: 
 
1) Homogeneous products and identical unit production costs.  
2) GenCos bid once in the market and choose quantities non-cooperatively and 
simultaneously.  
3) A price will be determined that equates demand and supply. 
 
The first assumption is the same as that of the Bertrand game. The implication of the 
second assumption is that power producers choose their production level based on 
their own interest, and such choice is independent of the choices of other power 
producers. This is why it is known as a non-cooperative game. The choice each power 
producer makes is also based on the anticipation of other power producers’ quantities.  
 
The Cournot model utilizes two functions, the profit function and demand function. 
The profit function includes the market price, total and individual production, and 
individual marginal cost. When demand function is introduced, the first order of profit 
maximization will yield the results of individual quantities. Once quantities are 
chosen, market price will be determined. When there is only one unique equilibrium, 
a Nash-Cournot equilibrium exists. 
 
Although the outcome of the classic Cournot competition model is often questionable 
as the supply side ultimately chooses the price level, Cournot equilibrium is still 
favored in investigating imperfect competition in various industries, including the 
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electricity market. The withholding of output by the power producers in order to raise 
the market price is a typical feature in Cournot competition.   
 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium is a well-known strategy adopted by market players during 
market competition [8]. This thesis focuses on the quantity game which is the 
foundation of Nash-Cournot equilibrium. The reason for choosing the Nash-Cournot 
competition model is that it focuses on quantity strategies which will influence market 
price.  
 
One of the main features of Cournot competition is its ability to incorporate quantity 
as part of price in a demand function. In the demand function, price is a function of 
quantity demanded in the market. The function describes an inverse relationship 
between price and quantity. This creates opportunities for the generators to withhold 
capacity in order to raise the market price. Depending on the level of elasticity of 
demand, the reduction in generation will result in a relatively greater increase in price 
and the profit of the individual generator will increase.  
 
Both demand function and elasticity of demand in Cournot competition have 
important implications in electricity market modeling. The Cournot model is found to 
be applicable for interpreting the electricity market features and has been widely used 
to represent generator behavior such as the matrix approach that is used in [9] to solve 
a three-player game. However, it is argued that the presence of capacity constraints 
should not be the necessary motivation for Cournot modeling. This means that, in 
most studies that are using Cournot competition to analyze generator behaviors, 
capacity constraint has not been considered as a constraint in the models.  
 
More realistically, there will be arbitragers, or traders, involved in the electricity 
market trading process. More attention should be paid to this as the Cournot 
competition includes conjectural variation, in which generators decide the generation 
and price level on the assumption that arbitragers will not change their purchases. The 
arbitragers are treated exogenously in the Cournot Conjectural variation model [10]. 
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In the classical Nash Cournot model, capacity withdrawal exists in most cases, 
especially when transmission constraint occurs. On the contrary, the analytical model 
ensures that demand is always satisfied at all times. Demand elasticity is incorporated 
directly into the market results calculation instead of using the market clearing price. 
This approach enables the load demand to directly obtain the market results by tuning 
its demand elasticity. The intention is to show that there should be more 
encouragement of demand side participation in market competition. In the classical 
economic dispatch, the load demand is highly inelastic. From the load curve, there is 
only change in physical volume of demand. The demand responsiveness, which is 
represented by demand elasticity, has been understated. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis  
 
The research hypothesis is that demand elasticity and system constraints will have a 
critical influence on the power producers’ competition results in terms of market 
clearing price, individual output and profit. Load demand can utilize demand 
elasticity to affect its final payment to the market. Such ability is expected to be 
limited in the case where system constraints, i.e. generation limit and transmission 
limit, exist. Extended Cournot model can be used for analyzing the impact of demand 
elasticity and system constraints on electricity market outputs.  
 
1.4 Contributions of this thesis 
 
From the literature review, it can be concluded that the impact of different types of 
constraints on GenCo market strategies has not been sufficiently addressed. In 
addition, the impact of demand elasticity has not been fully investigated. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an Extended Cournot model (ECM) based on 
conjectural variations models. One of the objectives of this thesis is to use elasticity in 
the ECM with different constraints, such as generation and transmission constraints. 
The main advantage of ECM is the ability to interpret the relationship between 
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elasticity of demand and other key market indicators, for example, market price, 
individual generation, and individual profit. With the introduction of constraints, the 
different impact of elasticity on the market can be shown [61], [62], [63], [64], and 
[65]. 
 
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows. 
 
 The Extended Cournot model developed in this thesis considers more factors 
affecting the outcomes of market competition, such as demand elasticity, 
generation capacity constraint, transmission constraint as compared to the 
classical Cournot model. As a result, the importance of demand 
responsiveness has been highlighted and investigated. Significant impact of 
demand elasticity on the market outputs has been identified. 
 
 This thesis has provided a tool for quantifying the impact of the demand side 
to the market outputs, which includes market clearing price, individual 
production and profit, and load payment. In the case of change in demand 
elasticity, the proportional change of market price and individual production 
against demand elasticity has been quantified. The results show how demand 
side participation can effectively influence the market outputs. It is also found 
that, when the generation and transmission constraints are implemented, the 
impact of demand elasticity on the market outputs will be affected. 
 
 It has been found that demand elasticity has much higher impact on the market 
clearing price at its lower bound session. This indicates that the demand side 
can effectively reduce the market clearing price by becoming more responsive.  
 
 The Extended Cournot model proposed in this thesis can be used to analyze 
imperfect competition on a scenario-to-scenario basis, given specific 
assumptions. In a scenario without any system constraints, this model can be 
used to predict realistic market results. Therefore, unlike the classical cournot 
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model, the Extended Cournot model can be applied to situations with and 
without system constraints.  
 
1.5 The contents of this thesis 
 
This thesis is organized as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 gives a comprehensive literature review on the issues of electricity market 
competition, game theory, Nash Cournot competition, network congestion, and 
demand elasticity.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the derivation of the Extended Cournot model which is integrated 
with elasticity of demand. It includes two cases, namely, change of total demand, and 
change of demand elasticity. System constraints have been investigated separately as 
generation and transmission capacity constraints. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the calculation results with two cases: 1) change in total demand 
and 2) change in demand elasticity. For each case, three scenarios were investigated, 
i.e., i) without constraint, ii) with generation capacity constrain, iii) with generation 
and transmission constraints,. The purpose is to show the different impact demand 
elasticity has on market results with and without system constraints during market 
competition.  
 
Chapter 5 compares the simulation results from a market simulator, Plexos, with the 
results from Chapter 4. Plexos has the option to include demand elasticity when 
modeling market competition. Therefore, it is a practical to compare the results from 
the Extended Cournot model with the ones from Plxos. 
 










This literature review has covered a number of market-related issues in the electricity 
supply industry. First, market competition, which includes pricing and transmission 
congestion analysis, is reviewed as these marketing elements are the foundation of the 
research hypothesis. Second, Game Theory and Nash Cournot competition and their 
application to the electricity market are discussed in order to compare them with the 
Extended Cournot model proposed in this thesis. Third, demand responsiveness that 
has been considered as an important market variable, is discussed. 
 
2.1 Market competition related issues 
 
The analysis of decision-making process is becoming more important to the 
oligopolistic electricity market competition. Simple learning rules have been 
implemented in dynamic models for strategic bidding [11]. In [12], the authors define 
near-equilibrium as a case where generators maximize their profits and consumers 
maximize their economic utilities. They try to analyze the equilibrium in a 
competitive market with single time period using locational marginal price (LMP). It 
is suggested that the market near-equilibrium is an efficient approach for market 
monitoring on the generators’ profits. In [13], the author emphasizes the benefits of 
LMP compared to the actual market. It uses the Ontario market as a case study to 
prove that LMP can significantly improve both system reliability and market 
performance.  
 
Reference [14] analyzes changes in LMPs with respect to operational parameters, i.e., 
demands, generator cost parameters, and voltage bounds. It is believed that the 
changes in LMPs as parameters vary, providing insight into the functioning and 
behavior of the electric energy system. This information on sensitivity might help 
producers and consumers to establish their respective bidding strategies, and the 
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regulator to assess the degree of competitiveness of the electricity market. Simple 
analytical expressions are developed in [14] to compute LMP sensitivities with 
respect to changes in demands throughout an electric power network. 
 
In [15], a novel LMP policy for distribution system with significant penetration of 
distribution generation (DG) in a competitive electricity market is presented. A new 
LMP method is based on remunerating DG units for their participation in reduced 
levels of energy losses in distribution systems brought about by participation of all 
DG units in meeting demand. Since the LMP prediction methods used in [15] contain 
error, uncertainty modeling is implemented for modeling the effect of error in 
prediction on the LMP calculation. 
 
In [16], the authors investigate the marginal costs and prices in the electricity 
industry. The intention is to identify whether the consumers will be charged at the 
price levels that are indicative of the costs of supply. It is argued that appropriate 
market prices can send signals about both short run and long run costs. There is 
agreement with the opinion that a price that is higher than marginal cost indicates the 
exercise of market power. This can be understood as the recovery of long term capital 
costs. 
 
Reference [17] assesses the benefits and costs of the formation of regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs) by evaluating the marginal loss pricing scheme. It 
is argued that, for generators and consumers to receive appropriate short and long 
term signals in the transmission network, the loss component must be priced using 
marginal cost methods. A case study on the transmission losses in New York is used 
to illustrate the importance of marginal cost of transmission losses that will affect the 
generator’s bidding behaviors.  
 
In [18], the author assesses the market based price differentials in zonal and LMP 
market design. He tries to use LMP to reflect the actual costs of delivering energy by 
using an accurate network model to price in both congestion and losses with the 
market design simulations at the California Independent System Operator. The major 
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finding is that depending on the location of congestion, the simulations show that 
LMP will not create sustained adverse impact on market prices. Differences in LMPs 
are a result of increased transparency of prices that show the value of energy 
throughout the grid.  
 
A one snap-shot Nash equilibrium is presented in [19] to analyze the market 
competition with transmission constraints. In this model the authors demonstrate how 
to analyze the impact of transmission capacity on competition. The model is applied 
to the western U.S. electricity market. The results show that transmission constraints 
enhance the exercise of market power.  
 
Reference [20] focuses on congestion management and risk management issues in a 
practical case in Europe. A coordinated congestion mechanism has been developed by 
the authors in order to achieve higher level of market competition, maximum 
interconnection usage, and decreased risk for market participants.  
 
An analysis for the impact of network constraints on the market equilibrium is 
presented in [21]. The authors solved a two-level optimization problem in the model 
they designed. Firstly, the independent system operator (ISO) dispatches generation 
and sets transmission price through solving optimal power flow. Secondly, the 
individual generators use Nash-Supply function equilibrium strategy to submit their 
generation bids after taking into account the ISO’s decision. It is found that the 
generators have the intention to bid for generation close to the constraint boundary. 
This resulted in multi-Nash equilibriums, which means that generators may change 
their bidding behaviors. 
 
In [22], supplier equilibrium strategy is analyzed by considering transmission 
constraints. The Cournot model is used to simulate the market competition with a 2-
bus and a 3-bus network. The results show that, when there is potential transmission 
constraint, there might be multiple equilibriums in the Cournot competition. Another 
finding is that the transmission capacity must be far higher than the actual power flow 
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on the specific line in order to obtain the same equilibrium without transmission 
constraint. 
 
In [23] and [24], bidding strategies from the supply side under possible network 
constraint have been investigated to assess the level of competition and the market 
performance. The authors found that strategic behavior may mitigate the seriousness 
of congestion, while congestion offers additional opportunities for gaming to the 
producers. 
 
To characterize LMPs that appear in the payment cost objective function, the authors 
of [25] established and embedded Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of 
economic dispatch as constraints. They investigated the payment cost minimization 
problem with transmission capacity constraints as formulated. A regularization 
method was used to satisfy constraint qualifications. Their numerical results show that 
payment cost minimization leads to consumer payment savings as compared to bid 
cost minimization for the same set of supply bids. 
 
References [11] to [18] have focused on oligopolistic competition, and market pricing 
mechanisms, but they did not investigate further on the transmission constraints or the 
involvement of demand side. References [19] to [25] have investigated the impact of 
transmission constraints on a competitive electricity market. The constraints presented 
are focused on transmission side. However generation capacity constraint should also 
be investigated. 
 
2.2 Cournot modeling in electricity market competition 
 
A study on the market power of generators in the electricity market with transmission 
constraints is done in [26]. It is argued that many authors do not obtain the same 
results, nor do they indicate their assumptions in the Cournot models. A simplified 
duopoly model with one transmission line is presented in the paper. A transmission 
limit is applied to the model and a linear demand function is defined. With the 
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involvement of the System Operator, it is concluded that there is no direct relation 
between the use of transmission capacity and the transmission price outcome.  
  
A two-settlement equilibrium in competitive electricity markets is formulated in [27]. 
In this model, each generation GenCo solves a Mathematical Program with 
Equilibrium Constraints (MPE). The model includes forward and spot markets. It 
implements a two-solution approach and applies these solutions to a 6–node and 8-
line model. Two approaches, iterative Response Surface Method (RSM) and iterative 
Penalty Interior Point algorithm (PIPA), are compared. The authors expect that the 
generators’ market power is encouraged by raising the forward price to increase 
profits.  
 
Other supplier side modeling mechanism, such as the supply function equilibrium 
model, are also used to compare the market equilibrium with the one from Cournot 
competition model in the case of transmission constraint [28, 29].  It was found that 
strategic generators were able to capture all the congestion rental of the constrained 
line. They recommend that market rules be designed to restrict the bidding flexibility 
and eventually reduce the equilibrium prices.  
 
In [30], Cournot equilibrium is investigated in a simple network. The network consists 
of three buses, and each bus has one generator and one load. The study analyzes the 
Cournot competition with the existence of transmission constraints. The results from 
the model show that generators can significantly affect the line flows and market price 
through strategic behaviors. When transmission constraints existed, the market 
outcome became much more uncertain.  
 
A demonstration on the importance of active participation of transmission rights 
owners in a competitive market to achieve an efficient outcome is addressed in [31]. It 
is argued that, even without market concentration, congestion, and passive 
transmission rights will cause implicit collusion among generators. As a result, the 
market price will be higher than the marginal cost. The price deviation can also result 




In [32], the authors modeled Nash equilibrium through relaxation procedure and 
applied it to an objective function, known as the Nikaido-Isoda function. The 
Nikaido-Isoda function is defined as a transformation of an equilibrium problem into 
an optimization problem. The relaxation algorithm is used to calculate Nash 
equilibrium under constraint. The Nash equilibrium is applied to the IEEE 30-bus 
system. The emphasis is on the importance of price-demand elasticity. As elasticity 
changes, generators will also change their ways in order to collude.  
 
The strategic behaviors of the generators that may result in transmission congestion is 
discussed in [33]. The author calculates Nash-Cournot equilibrium in a critically 
congested 6–bus network. The finding is that Nash-Cournot equilibrium does exist in 
the case of transmission congestion.  
 
Both [34] and [35] used a simplified three generation power system model to 
investigate oligopolistic competition in the electricity market. The authors in [34] 
conducted a set of experiments on the oligopolistic markets with three generating 
companies, and their results show that market competition will converge into the 
results between perfect competition equilibrium and Nash Cournot equilibrium. In 
[35], a simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to 
show the basic idea of the authors’ proposed method. They focused on the analytical 
study of the equilibrium of N-company generation market. They obtained Nash 
equilibrium in a uniform price auction in the spot market.  
 
In [36], an analysis is conducted on the potential market power in a restructured New 
Jersey electricity market. The calculation of Nash-Cournot equilibrium is done with 
different demand levels during peak and off-peak periods. A price responsive demand 
curve is also included. It is found that there is a threshold level of demand at which 
the Cournot competition will result in higher market price if the actual demand is 
higher than the threshold level. When the demand level is lower than the threshold 
level, the effect of a Nash Cournot game on the price is relatively much smaller. A 
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rapid price increase is identified when there is a potential transmission constraint 
between New Jersey and the rest of the PJM market.  
 
Two Cournot models of imperfect competition among generators, one with arbitrage 
(Bilateral model) and the other with arbitrage (PoolCo model), are formulated in [37] 
and [38]. A congestion pricing scheme for transmission is concluded. The importance 
of including the transmission network, while modeling the Cournot competition and 
the choice of transmission pricing scheme, is addressed.  
 
A new algorithm is used in [39] to calculate the Cournot equilibrium without the 
presence of transmission congestion. The Cournot game is transformed into a three 
level decision-making process with economic signal exchange. The advantages and 
disadvantages between two popular methods (i.e., Cournot Equilibrium and Supply 
Function Equilibrium (SFE)) are compared to model competition. The model is tested 
by using a market comprising the generating units of the IEEE 3-area RTS9.  
 
References [40] and [41] have compared Cournot competition with Bertrand 
competition. In [40], the Australia National Electricity Market (NEM) was utilized as 
an example test system to validate the authors’ method. The comparison between 
Cournot model and other models, such as the Bertrand model, shows that the Cournot 
model has a more reasonable perfomance in the NEM. The comparison between 
Bertrand and Cournot competition in [41] shows that Bertrand competition can also 
yield Cournot outcomes depending on both the strategic variables and the context in 
which those variables are employed.  
 
Capacity withhold by generation companies has been investigated under Nash 
Cournot competition in [42] and [43]. The simultaneous move and sequential-move 
games in applied mathematics are used to model the interactions of the generation 
companies, transmission network and market operator. The results from the 
simulations in the six-bus Garver’s example system and the IEEE 14-bus system show 
that market power can be successfully modeled in the transmission augmentation 
algorithm [42]. The authors in [43] considered physical withholding of capacity in the 
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energy market and the HHI index is utilized to measure market concentration. They 
found that market design is crucial to determine the possible existence of capacity 
withhold and market power.  
 
Other papers, such as [44], [45] and [46] focused on electricity markets that are 
cleared by merit order using pure strategy Nash equilibrium. They analyzed how 
market power is influenced by the number and size of the competing generation 
companies. 
 
There are other studies done on Cournot competition, such as [47], [48], [49], [50], 
[51] and [52]. Reference [47] modeled Cournot prices with generator availability and 
demand uncertainty, but with no consideration of transmission congestion. Reference 
[48] used an agent-based test bed, AMES (a market software package), to study the 
power market operations subject to generation constraints, transmission constraints, 
and strategic behaviors. Reference [49] investigated Nash Cournot equilibrium in 
power markets in both PoolCo and Bilateral models. The authors found that Cournot 
competition among producers yields the same outcomes for both market designs. A 
competitive co-evolutionary algorithm is used to model agents’ interactions in the 
market by finding the Nash Cournot Equilibrium [50]. A Game theoretical approach 
is also compared with other decision making methods, such as cost benefit analysis 
[51]. A direct computation is developed to calculate Nash Equilibrium of electricity 
markets using the supply function model [52]. 
 
A large number of simulations have been done in [26] to [52] on the Cournot 
competition with the presence of transmission constraints. However, they did not 
specify the important impact that demand elasticity could have on market 
competitions. 
 
2.3 Demand elasticity 
 
The responsiveness of customers to price changes is characterized by their “price 
elasticity of demand” [53]. Demand responsiveness plays a vital role in increasing 
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efficiency and reducing price volatility in the electricity markets. The authors of [53] 
investigated demand-bid price sensitivity and supply-offer price caps on LMPs. They 
modeled a restructured wholesale power market operating through time subject to 
transmission line constraints, generation capacity constraints and strategic trader 
behavior 
 
The authors of [54] modeled demand response programs in the power markets. They 
developed an extended responsive load economic model based on price elasticity and 
customer benefit function. In [55], the authors investigated the influence of price 
responsive demand shifting bidding on congestion and LMPs in pool-based day-ahead 
electricity markets. They compared the price responsive demand and conventional 
price responsive and price taking bids. They found that the conventional price taking 
bids encourages the GenCos to exercise market power and may lead to uncontrolled 
LMPs and system congestion.  
 
Authors of [56] found that increment in the demand elasticity provides the expected 
positive results in market performance in terms of the Lerner index and the reduced 
congestion in the network. Similarly, the results from the simulations in [57] which 
attempt to quantify the effect of demand response show that market clearing price 
tends to reduce with increasing level of demand shifting.  
 
However, the study conducted in [58] shows that, although demand response provides 
an important contribution to the electricity market, its contribution has limited impact 
on reliability of supply side resource and the capacity market. There is also a study 
that focuses on the analysis of a competitive power market with constant elasticity 
function, using Cournot game to determine the market equilibrium and price level 
[59]. The behavior of customers under different demand response programs is 
modeled considering incentive and penalty mechanisms [60].   
 
In [53] to [60], demand elasticity, sometimes also called demand response, is 
introduced in the discussion of power market. But the impact of change in the 




The following issues need further investigations:  
 
 The system constraints can be considered in two different areas, i.e. generation 
constraints and transmission constraints. Most of the studies that mention 
constraint are only focused on transmission constraint. The generation 
capacity itself also implies a constraint to the electricity market and network. 
Especially when the marginal costs are different among generators, the 
generation capacity constraint does significantly affect the outcome of 
Cournot equilibrium. The issue of generation capacity constraint has not yet 
been identified fully in the literature.  
 
 The price elasticity of demand has been mentioned in several papers, but none 
of them has included it as an input variable into their mathematical models. 
The elasticity of demand is a key factor to help include dynamics into the 
calculations of Cournot competition. The effect of change of demand elasticity 
on the individual generation of each generator and their profits needs to be 
investigated  
 
 The price derivative against elasticity has also not been addressed. One of the 
key indicators in measuring generators’ strategic behaviors is the market price 
level. As the elasticity of demand changes, market price will also change as 
consumers may change their demand with the response to the change in price.  
 
 The individual quantity derivate against elasticity has not been investigated. 
The individual quantity refers to the generation of each generator, which is 
determined by the Cournot equilibrium. As the elasticity of demand is 
included, the total quantity demanded by the customer may change, and this 
will result in a change in the corresponding total generation. Therefore, the 
share of the total generation among the generators will be different. 
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3.1 Classic Cournot model and Nash equilibrium in game 
theory 
 
In the classic model of Cournot competition, players compete with each other through 
their quantity bids. This competition model applies to the game comprising two or 
more players. Within Cournot competition, the most popular solution concept is 
called Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium exists when each player has chosen a 
strategy and no player can benefit by changing his strategy while the other players 
keep theirs unchanged. There are two important assumptions for Cournot competition. 
Firstly, one player decides his strategy or decision on quantity bid, taking into account 
the others’ quantity decisions. This means that the player’s payoff or profit depends 
not on his own quantity but also the quantities of other players. Another assumption is 
that players decide their quantity bids simultaneously. The simultaneous aspect 
implies that each player chooses his quantity without knowing the choices of others 
[6], [31], [34], [35], [36], [40].  
 
A two-stage game between expected profit maximizing GenCos has shown an unique 
equilibrium in the Cournot competition. In the first stage, GenCos decide their 
production simultaneously and independently. In the second stage, GenCos choose 
price simultaneously and independently and the demand is allocated among GenCos 
at the market clearing price level. If the demand function is concave, the Cournot 
outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome. The result shows an important finding 
that quantity competition is a choice of scale with GenCos competing by means of 
their cost functions.  The weight of each GenCo’s own cost over average GenCos’ 




However, the classical Cournot model initially does not consider the constraints, such 
as generation capacity and transmission network constraints. It seeks the equilibrium 
based on the supply side, for example, the marginal costs of the GenCos have 
significant impact on the individual output. There is a high possibility that demand 
may not be 100% satisfied.  Although demand function, with demand intercept and 
slope, is used for calculation, the demand elasticity has not been specified.  
 
In this Chapter, an Extended Cournot model is developed. It includes the 
consideration of elasticity of demand as an important input to the model itself. In this 
thesis, system constraints are modeled as generation and transmission constraints. 
Demand elasticity is included which allows load to express its willingness to reduce 
consumption when price changes. Therefore, the investigation is focused on the 
impact of generation constraints, transmission constraints and demand elasticity on 
GenCo’ market strategies. Table 3.1 represents a comparison between the Cournot 
classical model and the Cournot extended model. In the Cournot extended model, 
demand elasticity becomes a very critical input variable. With the analysis of price 
derivate and generation quantity derivative, it is possible to demonstrate the impact of 
marginal change in elasticity of demand on the market price and quantity produced by 
each generator.  
Table 3.1 
Comparison between two different Cournot models 
 Classical Cournot model Extended Cournot model 
Input 
variables 
 Marginal cost 
 Total demand 
 Marginal cost 
 Total demand 
 Demand elasticity 
 Generation constraints 




 Market clearing 
price 
 Generation 
 Market clearing price 
 Price derivative 




3.2 Derivation of Extended Cournot model  
 
Cournot competition has been used extensively in duopoly competition, with two 
players, and oligopoly competition, with multiple players, to investigate how GenCos 
are maximizing their profits by using quantity as a strategy.  
 
The maximization problem of individual profit in the case of three GenCos is derived 
as follows: 
 
Max ( i  )         (3.1) 
 
where, 
i  3,2,1i …n  - individual profit of GenCoi 
 
As each GenCo normally acts in its own self-interest, the profit maximization 
function of a company in an oligopoly competition with three GenCos can be 
described as follows: 
 
iiii QCQP *         (3.2) 
         
where, 
i   - individual profit of GenCoi 
P   - market clearing price 
iQ   - individual output of GenCoi 
Q   - total production output  
iC   - marginal cost of GenCoi 
 
In the competition of a Cournot model, the Nash Cournot equilibrium is the solution 
of the game. However, the assumption is that each GenCo chooses its own quantity 
level assuming that the quantities of other GenCo are fixed [8]. As each GenCo 
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maximizes its own profit against its quantity, Nash Cournot equilibrium only requires 







) to ensure the profit maximization. Setting the partial derivative of Equation (3.2)  to 























 is the price derivative. It shows the marginal change in market 
price over the marginal change in quantity produced by all GenCo.  
 








          (3.4) 
 






normally considered as negative, which means that when price increases, the total 
quantity demanded at the load is going to decrease.  Therefore, Equation (3.4) can be 
simplified to the following, 
 
0 ii CPQ         (3.5) 
 
Equation (3.5) implies that a GenCoi’s quantity change has an inverse relationship 
with its marginal cost. This means that a GenCo with higher cost will produce less 
output. This describes the rule of quantity distribution among the GenCos in the 
quantity game. When a GenCo’s costs rise, its production will decrease. This also 
indicates a potential relationship between GenCoi’s costs and the output of the other 
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GenCos. For example, the increase in GenCoi’s costs may result in an increase in the 
production of the other GenCos.  
 









       (3.6) 
where, 
P  - market clearing price 
a  - intercept of the demand function 
b  - slope of the demand function 
Qi        -  individual quantity production of GenCoi 
 
 
3.3 Cournot Extended model with no constraints 
 
The objective function in the case with no constraints is Equation (3.1). After taking 
the first derivative, Equation (3.7) is the condition for profit maximization.  
 





























%        (3.7) 
where, 
  - Demand elasticity, 
Q%  - Percentage change in quantity demanded by consumer 
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 in Equation (3.3) is 
replaced by  
Q
P
 of equation (3.8). The following Equation (3.9) is then obtained, 
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)(          (3.10) 
 
As the total demand equals the total supply, which is the sum of all individual 









          (3.11) 
where 
n - the number of GenCos in the market.  




)(   of  Equation (3.10), and the 
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as shown in Equation 
























       (3.14) 
 
The above equations are based on the assumptions that demand elasticity , total 
demand Q , and marginal cost of all generation companies iC  are known, and, the 
market price P  and individual output iQ  are unknown. 
        
According to Equation (3.13), the market price is determined by the marginal cost, 
elasticity of demand, and the number of GenCos. It can be seen that market price is 
independent of the total quantity demanded by the load. 
 
This is another key difference between the Extended Cournot model and the classical 
Cournot model. In the classical Cournot model, the market price is highly dependent 
on the total quantity that is expressed in a demand function. Whereas in the Extended 
Cournot model, market price is not depending on the total quantity. 
  
In Equation (3.14), GenCo’s individual quantity is determined by marginal cost, 
elasticity of demand, number of GenCos and total demand.  
 
Note that the sign of demand elasticity is negative, which represents the inverse 
relationship between market price and quantity. For example, comparing the levels of 
demand elasticity between -0.75 and -0.5, it is stated that the elasticity of demand is 
25 
 
higher at -0.75 than the one at -0.5 in absolute value. The price elasticity of -1.0 
means that a 1% increase in price, will result in a 1% decrease in quantity.  
 















        (3.15) 
 
The partial derivative of GenCoi’ quantity with respect to demand elasticity is given 
















 1  is the average marginal cost 
 

















       (3.17) 
 
Once elasticity of demand is given, the quantity of power generated has an inverse 
relationship with the marginal cost. It means that the lower the marginal cost of the ith 
GenCo, the higher the quantity produced. It looks similar to the classical economic 
dispatch, however Equation (3.17) does not take into account the weight of individual 
capacity iQ  in the measure of average marginal cost C . In principle, the maximum 
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capacity of the GenCos can be different. In this thesis, for simplicity purpose, the 
maximum capacities of the GenCos are set to be all equal.   
 
Equation (3.17) also shows that output increases when the cost of the ith GenCo is 
lower than the average cost, and decreases when the cost of the ith GenCo is higher 
than the average cost. It remains constant (derivative equals to zero) when the cost of 
the ith GenCo is equal to the average cost, i.e. CC i  .  
 
3.4 Derive Extended Cournot model with constraints under 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions  
 
The Kuhn-Tucker theorem is used to solve the profit maximization problem of the 
players in the Extended Cournot model setting with constraints. In the Extended 
Cournot model, partial derivative is taken for individual profit against individual 
quantity production. This is not an optimization of the sum of total profits.  
 
According to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, the non-linear programming problem can be 
described as follows [65]: 
 
)(max xf          (3.18) 
subject to 0)( xgi  i = 1, … , n 
where f(x) is the objective function and gi(x) is the constraint function. 
 
The assumption is that all functions are differentiable. 
There are three conditions to hold: 
1) *x  is feasible 
then, there exist multipliers nii ,...,1,0  , such that  








0*)(*)(   
27 
 
where *)(xf is maximization of the objective function 
 









)()()()(),(       (3.19) 
 
Two multipliers,   and  , are introduced for the generation capacity and 
transmission capacity constraints, in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively. 
 
3.4.1 Generation capacity constraint 
 
i  is assumed to be the multiplier determined by the relationship between iQ  and 
max
iQ , then, the following is obtained  
 
0)( max  iii QQ , 0i        (3.20) 
where, 
max
iQ   - GenCoi’s maximum generation capacity 
 
Referring to the Kuhn–Tucker theorem, the term )( max iii QQ   should be zero which 
means that both factors can be zero. For Equation (3.20), this means that if a generator 
is fully dispatched, i.e. ii QQ 
max , then the multiplier i  can be zero or non-zero in 
this case. But if a generator is not fully dispatched, i.e., ii QQ 
max , i  equals to zero 
for Equation (3.20) to hold.  
 
This means that i  can be considered as a penalty imposed on the GenCos when their 
real outputs are equal to the maximum. In this way, the penalty will be accounted for 
when calculating the marginal cost of a GenCo. For example, if GenCo1 is producing 
at maximum capacity, its marginal cost becomes 11 C . This makes GenCo1 more 
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expensive and not as economical as before. The same principle applies to other 
GenCos.  
 
The maximization problem is the profit maximization of each generator, which is 
described as follows: 
 
Max i           (3.21) 
subject to 0max  ii QQ  
)( max iii QQ  =0, 0i  
 
Therefore, the Lagrange function can be rewritten as follows: 
 
)()()()(),( max iiiiiiiiiiii QQQCQPQgQL     (3.22) 
 
s.t.   0max  ii QQ  
 0)( max  iii QQ  
 
The following is defined, 
 
t







max       (3.23) 
 
Based on equation (3.22), the individual profit function can be rewritten to the 
following, 
 
)()( max iiiiiii QQQCQP        (3.24) 
 
By taking the first order derivative of equation (3.24.) with respect to Qi, the 
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       (3.28) 
 
 
The above equations are based on the assumptions that demand elasticity , total 
demand Q , and marginal cost of all generation companies iC  and the sum of 
individual generation capacity multiplier   are known, and, the market price P , 
individual output iQ  and individual generation capacity multiplier i are unknown. 
 
According to Equation (3.27), the market price is depending on  . In Equation 
(3.28), iQ  is determined by i  and  . 
 
To investigate the impact of the marginal change of price and quantity with respect to 
the change of elasticity of demand, derivatives on Equations (3.27) and (3.28) were 
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1         (3.31) 
and C as defined previously.  
 






























     (3.32) 
 
 
3.4.2 Generation and transmission capacity constraints 
 
After the introduction of generation capacity limit as a constraint, another constraint is 
imposed on the transmission line between bus j and bus k. The idea is to create a 
potential transmission constraint for transmitting power from the most economical 
GenCo to the load. It is necessary to note that the transmission limit between buses j 
and k can also be modeled with constraint.  
 
The maximization problem is still the profit maximization of each generator as 
described in Equation (3.21). However it is subject to the following: 
 
subject to  0max  ii QQ  
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iijk QdT  
 
where, 
id   - percentage of iQ  goes through line jkL  
jkT   - transmission capacity of line jkL  
 
The possible transmission constraint is assumed on line jkL , and this constraint 
applies to every GenCo’s profit function.   
 




























   (3.33) 
 
For the transmission capacity constraint,    is assumed as the multiplier determined 






 and jkT . 
 











P         (3.34) 
 
 
    




























































































1   (3.37) 
 
Again, when first derivate is taken on Equations (3.35) and (3.36) in respect to 
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Based on the above equations, simulations have been conducted using the Extended 











Chapter 4  
 
Simulation results of analytical model 
 
In order to illustrate the hypothesis more clearly and easily, a simplified three-bus 
benchmark network as shown in Figure 4.1 is used. It should be mentioned that in a 
few papers [30], [31], [33] a similar simplified power system network was used to 
model Nash Cournot competition in the presence of transmission constraints. In 
principle, the extended Cournot competition can be applied to a more complicated 
power system network. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Simplified three bus benchmark DC network 
As shown in Figure 4.1, there is one GenCo on each node, and a load is placed on 
node 3 where the most expensive generator is located. It is important to note that the 
position of load in the network is critical to the market competition output. The reason 
to place the load on bus 3 is to distance it from the more economical generators, 
which are generators 1 and 2. The load position is important in the case of imposing 
transmission constraints, in which the load may not be able to acquire as much power 
as it wishes from the more economical generators. 
The simulations performed in this thesis covered market operations under the 
following two cases: 
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 Case 1: Change in total demand  
 Case 2: Change in elasticity of demand 
 
In each case, three different scenarios are presented based on the level of constraints 
that were introduced, which include: 
 Scenario 1: No constraints 
 Scenario 2: Generation capacity constraints 
 Scenario 3: Transmission and generation capacity constraints 
 
To present the market competition results, the focus is on the following output 
variables for analysis 
 GenCos’ individual output 
 GenCos’ individual profits 
 Market clearing price 
 Load payment 
 
4.1 Case formulation 
 
For these simulations, the following assumptions were made: 
 
 The change of quantity demanded does not affect the market clearing price in 
a Nash-Cournot game as discussed earlier, given that demand elasticity is 
constant. This is different from the traditional understanding that the change of 
demand will cause an increase in price due to the decrease in the supply side, 
which is generally an economic dispatch approach.  
 
 With the introduction of system constraints, the impact of demand elasticity on 
market competition will be more limited. The demand side is usually expected 
to utilize its demand elasticity to bid in order to reduce the market clearing 
price and the load payment. The existence of systems constraints, especially 
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the transmission constraints can significantly offset the effect of demand 
elasticity.  
 
4.1.1 Marginal cost Ci 
 
The marginal costs (Ci) in Rand (R ) terms of GenCos are assumed as follows: 
1001 RC   
1502 RC   
2003 RC   
 
It is possible to change the difference interval between the GenCos’ costs as they may 
significantly affect the allocation of demand among GenCos.  However this is not the 
focus of this thesis and can therefore be investigated in future research. 
 
4.1.2 Generation capacity 
 
The maximum outputs of the GenCo are denoted as O.  
 
In scenario 1, with no constraints, the maximum generation capacities of three 





1  ,  
 





1   
 
It is assumed that due to the existence of generation capacity constraints for all 
GenCos, the impact of demand elasticity on market competition will decrease. The 
multiplier i  can be considered as a penalty added to the marginal cost when a 
specific GenCo is fully dispatched. This will cause an increase in market clearing 




4.1.3 Transmission capacity 
 
In scenario 3, with generation and transmission constraints, for example as shown in 
Figure 4.2, a network constraint with a maximum transmission capacity  of 225 MW 
is applied to line 13L , which is the transmission line between bus 1 and bus 3. The 




Fig. 4.2 An example of 3-bus network with transmission network constraints with total demand of 600 
MW 
 
In general, if the percentages of 1Q  and 2Q goes through line 13L increase, which are 
1d  and 2d , respectively, the flow of power from bus 1 to bus 3 via line 13L will 
increase. This will affect the proportion of power to be delivered from GenCo1 to the 
load.  
 
The value of id , which is the percentage of iQ  goes through line jkL , can be changed 




In the calculations in this thesis, it is assumed that all three lines have the same 
impedance to ensure that the power flow satisfies Kirchhoff Law. This is also due to 
the consideration of a simplified network. 
 
4.1.4 Demand elasticity  
 
To define within which area elasticity can vary, based on Equations (3.13), the 




Since 1n  is the denominator in Equation (3.13), it should be less than, but not 
equal to, zero.  
 
In this study, the number of GenCos is three, therefore the value of n equals to 3. 
 












































To meet the above condition, iC  is replaced with the marginal cost of GenCo1, 












   
 
In the calculation, it is found that the market results for value of demand elasticity 
within the area of -0.3334 to -0.4334 become extremely volatile. There is large 
change in the output variables, such as market clearing price, individual quantities, 
against the demand elasticity. This is due to the fact that the impact of demand 
elasticity, at the lower bound of its value, is significantly high on the above mentioned 
variable. Therefore, the results with the area of demand elasticity between -0.4334 to  
-1.3334 are considered in this thesis.   
 
It is necessary to pay attention to the negative sign: -1.3334 which is lower (more 
negative) than -0.4334, but economically speaking, elasticity is higher (in absolute 
value) at -1.334. 
 
4.2 Case Discussion 
 
4.2.1 Change of total demand with constant demand elasticity 
 
The assumptions in this section are as follows: 
 Demand elasticity stays constant, with -0.6667 (there is no particular reason 
for choosing the demand elasticity at -0.6667, it can be any value between -
0.4334 to -1.3334) 
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 Marginal cost stays constant at R100/MW, R150/MW and R200/MW, 
respectively 
 Total demand varies from 100 MW to 800MW with 100 MW interval 
 
The change of total demand can be explained by Figure 4.3. The total demand curves 
in Figure 4.3 have the same interception on the vertical axis, which represents the 
highest market clearing price. The horizontal axis represents the total demand. When 
the demand elasticity is constant, a horizontal dashed line shows that price stays the 
same at P* at different total demand. The elasticity of demand is the same at point A, 
B, C and D.  
 
 
Fig. 4.3 Change of total demand with constant demand elasticity 
 
4.2.2 Change of demand elasticity with constant total demand 
 
The assumptions in this section are as follows: 
Demand 1 Demand 4 Demand 3 Demand 2 
Quantity (MW) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
D CB A 
P*
Market clearing price (Rand/MW) 
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 Demand elasticity varies from -0.4334 to -1.3334 
 Marginal cost stays constant with R100/MW, R150/MW and R200/MW, 
respectively 
 Total demand stays constant at 600 MW 
 
The change of demand elasticity can be described in Figure 4.4. The demand 
elasticity at point E, F, G and H are different from each other. The vertical dashed line 
represents the same quantity demanded at Q*. As demand elasticity changes with 
constant total demand, different market clearing prices are obtained.  
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Change of demand elasticity with fixed total quantity demand and constant marginal cost 
 
 









Market clearing price (Rand/MW) 
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4.3 Case 1 - Change of total demand with constant demand 
elasticity 
 
4.3.1 Scenario 1 - with no system constraints 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the value of the market clearing price over the change of total 
demand. It is found that the market price does not change as total demand increases. 
According to the conventional electricity supply industry, as demand increases, price 




Fig. 4.5 Market clearing price with 100MW change interval of total demand, where demand elasticity 
stays constant at -0.6667 
 
However, in the case of Extended Cournot model competition, the market clearing 
price is not determined by the total demand. As shown in Equation (3.13), market 
clearing price is determined by the demand elasticity and the sum of the marginal cost 































results match the expectation that the market clearing price does not change if total 
demand changes.  
 
Figure 4.6 shows the level of GenCos’ individual outputs when total demand changes. 
All three GenCos’ individual outputs increase as total demand increases. The 
additional demand is allocated among GenCos according to their marginal cost. Each 
GenCo’s output is determined by the weight of its marginal cost over the sum of all 
the GenCos’ marginal costs.  
 
 
Fig. 4.6 Individual outputs with change of total demand, where demand elasticity stays constant at -
0.6667 
 
The results show that the lower the marginal cost of a GenCo, the more output will be 
required from this GenCo. Based on the assumption, GenCo1 is the most economical 
generator with the lowest marginal cost. The output of GenCo1 is the highest. 
Conversely, GenCo3 is the most expensive generator with the highest marginal cost, 
and its output is the lowest. Although the quantity allocation in Cournot competition 























































from the conventional economic dispatch. The conventional cost-based dispatching 
mechanism determines the output of generators based on their marginal costs. The 
most economical generator will be utilized as much as possible to satisfy the load 
before the more expensive generator is accepted.  
 
The Cournot competition is a quantity game, or a quantity competition. The 
equilibrium is based on the profit maximization of each individual GenCo. At the 
equilibrium point, the output levels of all GenCos are optimal. Even the more 
expensive GenCo will be dispatched before the less expensive GenCo is fully 
dispatched. The change of output levels in Figure 4.6 shows that any additional 
demand will be satisfied with the same pattern, or proportion, among the GenCos. 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the GenCos’ individual profits against the change of total demand. It 
can be seen from Figure 4.7 that individual output, iQ , increases as total demand, Q , 
increases. Therefore, individual profits increase as total demand increases. The 
proportional increase of each GenCo’s profit has a similar pattern to the example with 
an increase in quantity. 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Individual profits with change of total demand, where demand elasticity stays constant at -
0.6667 
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
π1 8889 17778 26667 35555 44444 53333 62222 71111
π2 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000





























Figure 4.8 shows the change of load payments as total demand changes and demand 
elasticity stays constant (-0.6667). As load payment is equal to the market clearing 
price multiplied by the total quantity demanded, the load payment increases as total 




Fig. 4.8 Load payments with change of total demand, where demand elasticity stays constant at -0.6667 
 
4.3.2 Scenario 2: with generation capacity constraint 
 
With generation capacity constraint, the market clearing price increases as total 
demand increases. When total demand was low, the allocation of output among 
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Figure 4.9 shows the change of market clearing pricing when total generation reaches 
its limit. As shown in Figure 4.9, when total demand increases, the most economical 
GenCo will be dispatched fully, i.e. 11 QQ  and i  will be non-zero. The quantity 
allocation among the three GenCos for a total demand of 600 MW is 250 MW, 207 
MW and 143 MW, respectively. The market clearing price reaches P=R311 at this 
demand level. The increase of market clearing price becomes non-linear at an 
accelerating rate. This means that, when the level of total demand becomes close to 
the total generation capacity limits of all three GenCos, the proportional increase of 














































Figure 4.10 presents the change of individual production given the generation 
capacity constraint. As shown in Figure 4.10, before reaching the maximum 
generation capacity, all GenCos’ output levels are the same as the ones without 
generation capacity constraints. When the capacity limit of a specific GenCo is 
reached, its output will remain constant. When GenCo1 is fully dispatched, GenCo2 
and GenCO3 both increase their outputs to meet the additional demand. For example, 
after the total demand reaches 600 MW, GenCo1 is fully dispatched; GenCo2 and 
GenCo3 are producing 207 MW and 143 MW, respectively. The proportional increase 

























































The individual profit change against total demand is shown in Figure 4.11. The 
individual profit is determined by both market clearing price and individual 
production. When both variables increase, the GenCos’ profit will increase at an 
accelarating rate. This applies to GenCo2 and GenCo3 in the case when GenCo1 is 
fully dispatched, as the market clearing price will only increase when one of the 
GenCo’s generation capacity limit is reached. In this case, GenCo1’s profit will only 
increase as the market clearing price increases as its production reaches maximum. 
But the profits of GenCo2 and GenCo3 will increase dramatically as both their 










































As shown in Figure 4.12, the change pattern of load payment is also affected by the 
generation capacity constraint. Load payment depends on total quantity demanded 
and the market clearing price. This indicates that load demand is bearing the cost of 












































4.3.3 Scenario 3: with generation and transmission capacity constraints 
 
Figure 4.13 presents the market clearing price with both generation and transmission 
constraints. By comparing with the price level in scenarios 1 and 2, the level of 
market clearing price is the highest among three scenarios. From the simulations, the 
total demand can only increase up to 735 MW under both constraints. This means 
that, with the existence of transmission constraints, GenCo1 and/or GenCo2 may not 
be able to be fully dispatched. This has also pushed the market clearing price higher 
as there is no marginal unit that can be supplied by the more economical GenCos, that 









































It is interesting to see that the individual production of GenCo1 first increases to its 
maximum capacity and then decreases as shown in Figure 4.14. GenCo2 and GenCo3 
both increase consistently until they reach their generation capacity limits. This 
pattern has clearly shown the impact of transmission capacity constraint on the market 
results,  i.e. the production of GenCo1 is forced to decrease as total demand increases 














100 200 300 400 500 600 700 735
Q1 44.40 88.90 133.30 177.80 222.20 250.00 243.00 235.10
Q2 33.30 66.70 100.00 133.30 166.70 207.10 233.38 249.90



























Figure 4.15 shows the individual profits under generation and transmission 
constraints. The individual profits of three GenCos are the same as scenario 2 until 
transmission constraint starts to take effect. In Figure 4.15, although GenCo1 has less 
production due to the transmission constraint, its profit is still higher than in the other 
two cases. This is due to the higher increase in market clearing price compared to a 
lower decline in production. GenCo2 and GenCo3 have also benefited from the 
existence of transmission constraints by supplying more production with a higher 













100 200 300 400 500 600 700 735
π1 8889 17778 26667 35555 44444 52778 69013 78647
π2 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 33373 54611 71105




























Load payment under generation and transmission constraint is shown in Figure 4.16. 
Load payment is higher than when there are no constrains and when there is 
generation constraint only. The main contribution towards the higher load payment is 
the increase in the market clearing price. This indicates that load demand is 




Fig. 4.16 Load payment with constant demand elasticity under generation and transmission constraints 
 
 
4.3.4 Summary of case 1 
 
The comparison of market results from all scenarios under case 1 is presented in this 
section. Since the maximum total demand varies from no constraint (800MW) to the 
one with generation capacity constraint (750MW) and transmission capacity 
constraint (R735MW), the total demand range that is used for comparison in this 
section is from 100MW to 700MW. 
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 Table 4.1 shows the individual production in case 1. For GenCo1, production reaches 
maximum at 250MW when total demand increases to 600MW in scenario 2 and 
scenario 3. GenCo1’s production decreases when total demand reaches 700MW in 
scenario 3 in order to avoid transmission congestion. A similar situation applies to 
GenCo2, when total demand increases to 700MW, its production reaches its maximum 
capacity at 250MW in scenario 2, but also needs to reduce to 233MW in scenario 3 in 
order to avoid the transmission congestion on line 13L . Although GenCo3 has the 
highest marginal cost, it takes advantage of its position of being at the same bus as the 
load demand. When total demand increases to 700MW, GenCo3’s production reaches 

































100 44 44 44 33 33 33 22 22 22 
200 89 89 89 67 67 67 44 44 44 
300 133 133 133 100 100 100 67 67 67 
400 178 178 178 133 133 133 89 89 89 
500 222 222 222 167 167 167 111 111 111 
600 267 250 250 200 207 207 133 143 143 













 Table 4.2 shows the comparison of market clearing price from all three scenarios in 
case 1. In scenario 1, without constraints, market clearing price stays unchanged. With 
the introduction of generation and transmission capacity constraints in scenarios 2 and 
3, market clearing price increases once the generation and transmission capacity limits 
are reached. When total demand increases to 700MW, market clearing price in 
scenario 3 is R384/MW, higher than R300/MW in scenario 1 and R350/MW in 
scenario 2, respectively.  
Table 4.2  
Comparison of market clearing price in case 1 








100 300 300 300 
200 300 300 300 
300 300 300 300 
400 300 300 300 
500 300 300 300 
600 300 311 311 
700 300 350 384 
 
Table 4.3 shows the comparison of individual profits in case 1. As individual profit is 
determined by the change of market clearing price and individual production, with the 
increase of market clearing price in scenarios 2 and 3, individual profits tend to 
increase. This is especially so when demand increases to 700MW, as all three GenCos 
reach highest profits in scenario 3 due to the presence of generation and transmission 
constraints.  
Table 4.3  




























100 8889 8889 8889 5000 5000 5000 2222 2222 2222 
200 17778 17778 17778 10000 10000 10000 4444 4444 4444 
300 26667 26667 26667 15000 15000 15000 6667 6667 6667 
400 35555 35555 35555 20000 20000 20000 8889 8889 8889 
500 44444 44444 44444 25000 25000 25000 11111 11111 11111 
600 53333 52783 52778 30000 33380 33373 13333 15878 15873 





Table 4.4 presents the comparison of load payment in case 1. With the same level of 
total demand, after the introduction of generation and transmission constraints, load 
payment becomes higher. When total demand increases to 700MW, load payment 
reaches the highest level of R268,799 in scenario 3.  
 
Table 4.4  









100 30000 30000 30000 
200 60000 60000 60000 
300 90000 90000 90000 
400 119999 119999 119999 
500 149999 149999 149999 
600 179999 186679 186667 
700 209999 245003 268799 
 
 
4.4 Case 2 - Change of demand elasticity with constant 
total demand 
 
4.4.1 Scenario 1: with no capacity constraints 
 













It can be seen from Figure 4.17 that the market clearing price is extremely high when 
demand elasticity is low. The price was R750, 150/MWh at the extreme lower bound 
of elasticity. The price level varies against demand elasticity, between the values of  
-0.4334 and -1.3334, as shown on the horizontal axis. This pattern explains the reason 
why only the value of demand elasticity between -0.4334 to -1.3334 is chosen for 
simulation. As mention above, in this thesis, the area of demand elasticity is 
calculated between -0.4334 to -1.3334. When the number of GenCos and the marginal 




Fig. 4.17 Market clearing price with the change of demand elasticity, where total demand stays 








































Figure 4.18 shows a clearer change of market price after zooming area of demand 
elasticity between -0.4334 to -1.3334, which cannot be seen clearly in Figure 4.17. 




Fig. 4.18 Market price without extreme lower bound of elasticity, where total demand stays constant at 
600MW 
 
In Figure 4.18, the pattern of price is similar to the one in figure 4.17. With the 
enlarged view, it can be seen that market clearing price approaches R200/MW at 
demand elasticity of -1.3334. It means that, as the demand becomes more responsive, 
market price drops. This indicates that the demand side can effectively reduce the 










































Figure 4.19 shows the individual production of GenCos against the change of demand 
elasticity. As shown in Figure 4.19, the individual output increases for GenCo1, it 
stays the same for GenCo2 and decreases for GenCo3. The reason for this type of 
change is that, when demand is more responsive to price, the most economical 
generator will be dispatched more fully first. In contrast, the more expensive a 
generator is, the less it will be dispatched. Marginal cost plays an important role in the 
determination of the output change pattern. The marginal cost of GEenCo2 is the 
mean of the marginal costs of GenCo1 and GenCo3. Therefore, its output level does 
not change. If the marginal cost of GenCo2 is close to that of GenCo1, its output will 
increase. On the other hand, if the marginal cost of GenCo2 is close to the one of 









































In Figure 4.20, when demand becomes more responsive to price, the more expensive 
GenCo will not be dispatched as fully as before. When demand elasticity is close to -
1.3334 for example, GenCo3 is not dispatched, and its profit becomes zero. The 




Fig. 4.20 Individual profits with change of demand elasticity without lower bound of elasticity, where 






































Figure 4.21 shows that load can effectively change its payment by changing its 
elasticity. It means that load payment can be reduced excessively if the demand is 
more responsive to market price. When the load is more elastic, it pays lower market 





Fig 4.21 Change of load payment with change of demand elasticity without lower bound of elasticity, 


































Figure 4.22 shows the marginal change of market clearing price over demand 
elasticity. As mentioned above, the absolute value of demand elasticity determines its 
level of impact. As demand becomes more elastic, for example changes from -0.5334 
to -0.6334, its marginal impact on market clearing price decreases until it is equal to 
the marginal cost of the most expensive GenCo. It can be seen that demand elasticity 






























































































In Figure 4.23, the shape of the derivatives of individual quantitiy output over demand 
elasticity for three GenCos are presented. As the three GenCos have the same 
difference interval of their marginal costs, the marginal change of GenCo2’ output,

 2Q , is not affected by the change of demand elasticity as its marginal cost equals to 
the average cost. Therefore, its derivative equals to zero. The outputs of GenCo1 and 
GenCo3 have constant and inverse pattern.  
 
It is important to note that as the value of demand elasticity is negative, the marginal 
change of the indivual production over demand elasticity should be intepreted 
inversely. It means that the maginal change of demand elasticity with 1 unit will cause 
200 MW increase of Q1, zero change of Q2 and a 200 MW  decrease of Q3. The 
change of demand elasticity is 0.1 in each interval, and has 10 intervals in total. 
Therefore, the changes in individual production of Q1, Q2 and Q3, are +20, 0  and -
20, respectively. Figrue 4.23 also shows that the maginal impact of demand elasticity 
on individual production is constant at different level of demand elasticity. 
 
 

























4.4.2 Scenario 2: with generation capacity constraint 
 
Fig. 4.24 presents the individual production with change of demand elasticity under 
generation constraint. The pattern of individual production of all GenCos changes 
after the demand elasticity reaches -0.6334 as shown in Figure 4.24. As GenCo1’s 
production stops increasing, the additional load demand is allocated between GenCo2 
and GenCo3. When demand elasticity reaches its maximum of -1.3334, GenCo1 and 
GenCo2 both reach their maximum capacity. The rest of the load demand is supplied 
by GenCo3. This is different from the case in which system constraint does not exist. 
The continuous supply from the most expensive generation company, i.e. GenCo3, is 
the main contribution to the high market clearing price. The higher price signal should 


















































The market clearing price is decreasing as the demand becomes more responsive. 
However, the impact of demand elasticity on market clearing price has been limited 
due to the generation capacity constraint. As shown in Figure 4.25, due to the effect of 
the multiplier of the relationship between the GenCo’s actual generation quantity and 
maximum generation capacity, mu, market clearing price is relatively higher after the 
demand elasticity reaches -0.6334, compared to the one in scenario 1. When demand 
elasticity is within its upper bound, the effect of the multiplier reaches its maximum. 
Even when the demand elasticity has reached its highest level, at -1.3334, the market 
clearing price does not go down to R200/MW as does GenCo3’s marginal cost 
because of the existence of the multiplier. Therefore, the market clearing price stays 
higher than in scenario 1. 
 
 







































Figure 4.26 shows the individual profit with change of demand elasticity under 
generation constraint. The individual profits of all GenCos are decreasing during the 
increase of demand elasticity in absolute value as shown in Figure 4.26. GenCo3 is 
still obtaining profit even when the demand elasticity reaches its maximum. GenCo1 
obtains less profit under generation constraint, after demand elasticity reaches -
0.6334, compared to scenario 1. The sum of individual profits with generation 
capacity constraint is higher than those without constraint. This is mainly due to the 
higher market clearing price and the continuous supply from the more expensive 
generation, i.e. GenCo3. In general, GenCo1 is worse off with the generation capacity 
constraint due to the fact that its dispatched generation declines. GenCo2 and GenCo3 
are better off with the generation capacity constraint. This can be explained by the 
fact that after reaching its generation capacity limit, GenCo1 keeps supplying the same 
amount of power at its low price. Therefore, its profit decreases more quickly than in 
the case where there is no constraint.  
 
 














































































Figure 27 shows the change of load payment against the change of demand elasticity. 
With the increase of demand elasticity, as shown in Figure 4.27, load payment 
decreases similarly to the scenario without constraint. However, the decreasing rate of 
load payment is less than in the case without generation capacity constraint. Since the 
total quantity demand remains unchanged at 600MW, as demand elasticity increases, 
the load payment is heavily dependent on the market clearing price. The market 
clearing price with generation capacity constraint includes the consideration of i . 
Therefore, the decrease of market price in the case with generation capacity constraint 
is not as much as the one without constraint. This has resulted in higher load payment 




































The pattern of the derivative of market clearing price over demand elasticity is 
presented in Figure 4.28. In the case of generation capacity constraint, the derivative 
of market clearing price over demand elasticity is not only determined by the sum of 
marginal cost and the value of demand elasticity, but also on the value of mu. It is 
important to note that, although the value of the derivative is higher than the one in 
the case without constraint, it does not necessary mean that demand elasticity has 
caused a higher change in the market clearing price in this case. This is mainly due to 
the penalty effect on the generation constraint from the supply side.  
 
 

















































































In Figure 4.29, the derivative of individual production over demand elasticity under 
generation capacity constraint is presented. The value of derivatives without 
generation capacity constraint is constant for all GenCos, but the values become non 
linear after the value of µ becomes non zero in the case with generation capacity 
constraint. As demand elasticity increases further, the impact of demand elasticity 
becomes weaker on the increase in GenCo1’s production. Over a certain point, 
GenCo2’s marginal production also starts to increase. The decreasing rate of GenCo3’s 
marginal production over demand elasticity is less than in the case without constraint.  
 
Different from scenario 1, the derivative of individual production over demand 
elasticity under generation capacity constraint is no longer constant after the level of 
demand elasticity increases over -0.5334. 
 
 



























4.4.3 Scenario 3: with generation and transmission capacity constraint 
 
Figure 4.30 shows individual production with change of demand elasticity under 
generation and transmission constraints. Individual production of all GenCos changes 
in the beginning and remains almost the same when demand elasticity is beyond -
0.8334. This means that demand elasticity has no further impact on individual 
productions at and above a certain point. It is believed that there is no room for the 
more economical GenCos, (i.e. GenCo1 and GenCo2) to supply any additional MW to 
the load due to the transmission constraint. For a quantity game, this will be the 
optimal solution among the GenCos.  
 
 

































Figure 4.31 presents the market clearing price change against demand elasticity under 
generation and transmission constraints. As shown in Figure 4.31, although market 
clearing price decreases similarly to the decreases in scenarios 1 and 2, the price level 
generally sits above those in cases 1 and 2. When transmission constraint exists, the 
more economical GenCo, such as GenCo2, may not be fully dispatched. The more 
expensive GenCo, such as GenCo3, will be dispatched more due to its position on the 
same bus as the load. This suggests that system constraints can effectively reduce the 














































In Figure 4.32, all GenCos’ individual profits against demand elasticity are presented. 
When demand elasticity reaches and beyond -0.8334, the individual profits are 
different for all GenCos from those in the other two scenarios. For GenCo1, its 
production does change, with a higher market clearing price received, its profit 
becomes higher. GenCo2 faces higher price and lower production, and as the former is 
greater than the latter, its production also increases. The generation company which 
benefits the most is GenCo3, almost doubling its profit compared to the scenario 2 
while the transmission constraint takes effect on the network. This is mainly due to 
the higher market price and the higher individual production of GenCo3 under both 



































In Figure 4.33, load payment with generation and transmission constraint is presented. 
With both generation and transmission capacity constraints, load payment is the 
highest out of all three scenarios. The higher market clearing price is the main driving 
force behind the increase in load payment. It causes the reduction in customer surplus 








































Figure 4.34 shows the derivative of market clearing price over demand elasticity 
under the presence of both generation and transmission constraints. The value of the 
derivative is higher than in scenarios 1 and 2. This is due to the penalty effect on the 









































Figure 4.35 shows the derivative of individual production over demand elasticity in 
scenario 3 with generation and transmission constraints. As shown in Figure 4.35, the 
value of the derivative for GenCo1 is almost no different to the one in scenario 2. This 
can be explained by the fact that its production is almost identical in scenario 2 and 
scenario 3. Due to lower production in scenario 3 for GenCo2, compared to scenario 
2, the derivative shows less increase in its production. The opposite result applies to 
GenCo3 with its higher increase in individual production resulting in higher value in 



































4.4.4 Summary of case 2 
 
Table 4.5 shows the comparison of market clearing price from all three scenarios in 
case 2. According to Table 4.5, market clearing price is highest in scenario 3 
compared to the other two scenarios. The diminishing effect of demand elasticity on 
market clearing price can be identified. 
 
Table 4.5 








-0.4334 650 650 650 
-0.5334 400 400 400 
-0.6334 317 324 324 
-0.7334 275 291 291 
-0.8334 250 269 271 
-0.9334 233 255 261 
-1.0334 221 244 253 
-1.1334 212 236 247 
-1.2334 206 231 243 
-1.3334 200 229 239 
 
 
Table 4.6 presents the comparison of individual production in case 2. In Table 4.6, in 
scenario 2 with generation capacity constraint, when GenCo1 and GenCo2 reach their 
maximum generation capacity, GenCo3 will be dispatched in order to meet the 
demand. Since GenCo3’s marginal cost is the highest, market clearing price will 
increase as the additional unit being dispatched determines the price level. In scenario 
3, with generation and transmission constraints, GenCo1 is fully dispatched. However, 
GenCo2 is not fully dispatched due the transmission capacity limit. Therefore, GenCo3 




































-0.4334 220 220 220 200 200 200 180 180 180 
-0.5334 240 240 240 200 200 200 160 160 160 
-0.6334 260 250 250 200 204 204 140 146 146 
-0.7334 280 250 250 200 213 213 120 137 137 
-0.8334 300 250 250 200 221 220 100 129 130 
-0.9334 320 250 250 200 230 220 80 120 130 
-1.0334 340 250 250 200 239 220 60 111 130 
-1.1334 360 250 250 200 247 220 40 103 130 
-1.2334 380 250 250 200 250 220 20 100 130 
-1.3334 400 250 250 200 250 220 0 100 130 
 
Table 4.7 presents the comparison of individual profits in case 2.  Although individual 
profits of all GenCos tend to decrease in all scenarios, with the existence of more 
constraints, the decreasing rate of individual profits becomes lower and lower. 
GenCo3 benefits from the existence of constraints. The general increase of individual 
profit for GenCo3, from scenarios 1 to 2 and 3, indicates that the effect of demand 
elasticity on individual profit is more limited with the existence of constraints. 
 
Table 4.7 




























-0.4334 120934 120934 120934 99933 99933 99933 80934 80934 80934 
-0.5334 71984 71984 71984 49983 49983 49983 31984 31984 31984 
-0.6334 56327 56092 56092 33326 35623 35623 16327 18122 18122 
-0.7334 48997 47637 47637 24996 29918 29918 8997 12418 12418 
-0.8334 44998 42302 42626 19997 26395 26472 4998 8897 9188 
-0.9334 42665 38633 40149 16665 24042 24308 2665 6543 7891 
-1.0334 41285 35952 38273 14284 22380 22673 1285 4881 6906 
-1.1334 40500 33908 36824 12499 21163 21399 500 3664 6151 
-1.2334 40111 32811 35680 11110 20311 20375 111 3124 5564 





Table 4.8 presents the comparison of load payment in case 2. It can be seen that load 
payment in scenario 3 is the highest of the three scenarios. As total demand stays 
constant, load payment will increase as market clearing price increases. This indicates 
that the existence of both generation and transmission constraints has significantly 
affected the demand side. The increase of load payment due to the constraints should 












-0.4334 389800 389800 389800 
-0.5334 239950 239950 239950 
-0.6334 189978 194622 194622 
-0.7334 164988 174329 174329 
-0.8334 149992 161525 162301 
-0.9334 139994 152718 156358 
-1.0334 132853 146286 151855 
-1.1334 127497 141380 148378 
-1.2334 123331 138747 145632 
-1.3334 119998 137144 143350 
 
 
Table 4.9 shows the comparison of market clearing price over demand elasticity in 
case 2. It can be seen that demand elasticity has more impact on the market clearing 
price at its lower bound session. With the penalty effect on the constraints, from the 
supply side and the network, the value of the derivative of market clearing price over 


















-0.4334 4993 4993 4993 
-0.5334 1249 1249 1249 
-0.6334 555 569 569 
-0.7334 312 330 330 
-0.8334 200 215 216 
-0.9334 139 151 155 
-1.0334 102 112 117 
-1.1334 78 87 91 
-1.2334 62 69 73 
-1.3334 50 57 60 
 
Table 4.10 shows the comparison of the derivative of individual production over 
demand elasticity in case 2. As the value of demand elasticity is negative, the 
marginal change of the individual production over demand elasticity is interpreted 
inversely. It can be seen that, with the increase of demand elasticity, the increase of 
individual production from GenCo1 and GenCo2 is more limited in the presence of 
generation and transmission constraints. On the other hand, the influence of demand 
elasticity on the reduction of GenCo3’s production is diminished when more 
constraints are introduced.  
 
Table 4.10 



























-0.4334 -200 -200 -200 0 0 0 200 200 200 
-0.5334 -200 -200 -200 0 0 0 200 200 200 
-0.6334 -200 -200 -200 0 0 0 200 200 200 
-0.7334 -200 -167 -167 0 -14 -14 200 181 181 
-0.8334 -200 -125 -125 0 -32 -32 200 157 157 
-0.9334 -200 -100 -100 0 -43 -39 200 143 139 
-1.0334 -200 -83 -83 0 -50 -33 200 133 116 
-1.1334 -200 -71 -71 0 -55 -28 200 127 100 
-1.2334 -200 -63 -62 0 -59 -25 200 121 87 
-1.3334 -200 -56 -56 0 -56 -22 200 111 77 
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Chapter 5  
 
Plexos simulation results and comparison with 
analytical model 
 
Simulation results obtained with Plexos software package are presented in this 
chapter. Results from Plexos and the analytical model are also compared. 
 
5.1 Brief description of Plexos 
 
Plexos is a power market simulator with solution methods based on linear, mixed 
integer and quadratic optimization. It is developed by Energy Exemplar.  
The Cournot Models that have been adopted in Plexos are based on the following 
assumptions [66]:  
• Producers behave as Cournot players, that is, each individual producer chooses 
its output to maximize its profit given its rivals’ outputs are fixed;  
• The transmission system is represented as a linearized DC network on which 
power flows are consistent with Kirchhoff’s laws;  
• Transmission pricing is based on locational marginal pricing; and  
• Both producers and arbitragers make output and pricing decisions under the 
assumption that their decisions do not affect transmission constraints and the 
fees that the Independent System Operator ISO charges for transmission 
services.  
 
Figure 5.1 shows the Cournot models used in Plexos with PoolCo and Bilateral 
models. In the PoolCo model, all participants bid supply and demand to the ISO. In 
the bilateral model, trading activities are conducted between electricity generators and 





Fig. 5.1 Illustration of Cournot Models in Plexos with PoolCo and Bilateral models [66] 
 
According to reference [66], the Cournot models implemented in Plexos simulate 
imperfect competition among generators that produce and sell electricity in a bilateral 
model. Reference [66] also demonstrated that if perfect competition exists among 
arbitragers in a bilateral model, then the PoolCo model and the bilateral model yield 
the same equilibrium prices under either perfect competition or Cournot competition. 
 
While implementing the Cournot competition models in Plexos, three common 
aspects are considered, which includes the following [66]: 
 
1) Transmission 
The electricity network is modelled as a finite set of nodes and a finite set of 
directed arcs. In general, constraints on transmission are represented by a 
finite number of linear inequalities. For the purposes of the models, the 
constraints are limited to i) constraints on the transmission capacities, and to 
ii) constraints on flow balance. Usually, the models use Kirchhoff’s laws and 
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Power Distribution Factors to implement a linearized DC network flow model. 
The reactive power flow is not taking into consideration.  
2) Consumers  
Consumers at node i consume q
i 
MW such that the price at node i (p
i
) is 
related linearly to consumption by the nodal demand function. The use of a 
linear demand function allows for the use of a Linear Complementarity or 
Quadratic Problem formulation in the model. 
3) Producers 
A producer maximizes its profit, i.e. revenues less costs, under an assumption 
of imperfect competition. The imperfect competition is modeled as Cournot 
behavior with respect to sales in the power market. A critical assumption of 
the models is that producers do not anticipate the impact of their output 
decisions on transmission congestion and prices. This assumption, therefore, 
eliminates the situations in which producers manipulate transmission in a 
strategic manner to their benefit. The disadvantage of the assumption is that it 
does not allow for the possibility that, in reality, producers recognize the 
impact of their decisions on transmission prices. The advantage, however, is 
that the models are solvable for realistically large networks.  
 
Although Plexos provides the platform for modeling the Cournot competition, there is 
a fundamental requirement for the demand side during the simulation, i.e. there must 
be at least one load demand on each node of the generation company. It means that, 
instead of having one load on bus 3 only, there are also two other loads situating at 
bus 1 and bus 2.  
 
However, as shown in Figure 5.2, in order to be consistent with the analytical model, 
the demand slope and intercept of load on bus 1 and 2 are set below the accepted 
market clearing price. This enables Plexos to simulate Cournot competition. It means 
that although there are physically three loads situating on three buses, respectively, 
load 1 and 2 are not going to require any MWs from the system as the market price 
will be above the maximum price level that they are willing to pay.  
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Figure 5.2 shows an example of the different system settings between the analytical 
model and Plexos, when the total demand equals to 700MW with no constraint. 
 
 
(a) Results from Analytical model calculation in case 1scenario 1 with total demand at 700MW 
 
 
(b) Results from Plexos simulation in case 1 scenario 1 with total demand at 700MW 
Fig. 5.2 Comparison of network configuration between analytical model and Plexos 
 
For scenario 2, a generation capacity limit of 250MW is imposed to all GenCos. 
Figure 5.3 shows an example of market results under generation capacity constraint 
between the analytical model and Plexos. The results between the analytical model 








(a) Results from Analytical model calculation in case 1scenario 2 with total demand at 700MW 
 
 
(b) Results from Plexos simulation in case 1 scenario 2 with total demand at 700MW 
Fig. 5.3  Results from analytical model and Plexos with generation capacity constraint 
 
For scenario 3, with the inclusion of transmission capacity constraint, when the 
quantity demanded changes, the results from the analytical model and Plexos are 
similar in most cases. The deviation is below the 10% region. As mentioned earlier, 
Plexos requires load on each bus that has a generation company.  
 
Figures 5.4 (a) and (b) illustrate an example of the comparison of case 1 scenario 3 
with a transmission capacity constraint of 240MW on line L13.   
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When total demand reaches 700MW, the analytical model shows that the generation 
allocation among the three GenCos, GenGo1, GenGo2 and GenGo3 are 243MW, 
233MW and 224MW, respectively (see Fig, 5.4-(a)). The results in Figure 5.4-(b) 
show that the production allocation is 250MW, 250MW and 219.64MW respectively. 
If purchaser3 alone is considered as the only total demand in the network, its 
demanded quantity of 701,38MW equals to the total production of 719.64 less the 












(b) Results from Plexos simulation in case 1 scenario 3 with total demand at 700MW 




5.2 Comparison of Case 1 Scenario 1 (change of total 
demand with no constraint) 
 
For case 1, the results on change of total demand from 100MW to 800MW show that 
there is an almost 100 percent match between the analytical model and the Plexos 
simulations. As shown in Table 5.1, the market clearing price remains unchanged at 
the level of 300 unit price. There is very little difference in individual profits and load 



















Comparison of case 1 scenario 1 with change of Q 


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








100 44 33 22 8889 5000 2222 30000 300 
200 89 67 44 17778 10000 4444 60000 300 
300 133 100 67 26667 15000 6667 90000 300 
400 178 133 89 35555 20000 8889 119999 300 
500 222 167 111 44444 25000 11111 149999 300 
600 267 200 133 53333 30000 13333 179999 300 
700 311 233 156 62222 35000 15555 209999 300 
800 356 267 178 71111 40000 17777 239999 300 
  


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








100 44.4 33.3 22.2 8889 5000 2222 30000 300 
200 88.9 66.7 44.4 17778 10000 4444 60000 300 
300 133.3 100.0 66.7 26667 15000 6667 90000 300 
400 177.8 133.3 88.9 35556 20000 8889 120000 300 
500 222.2 166.7 111.1 44444 25000 11111 150000 300 
600 266.7 200.0 133.3 53333 30000 13333 180000 300 
700 311.1 233.3 155.5 62218 34998 15555 209986 300 




Table 5.1 shows that the results from analytical model and Plexos match perfectly in 
case 1 scenario1. This proves that this part of the analytical models can be validated 
by the simulation results from Plexos.  
 
5.3 Comparison of Case 1 Scenario 2 (change of total 
demand with generation capacity constraint) 
 
 
Similar to the results in case 1 scenario 1, the comparison of scenario 2 with a change 
in total demand indicates a fair match between the analytical model and Plexos 
simulations as shown in Table 5.2,. The slight difference on individual profit and load 
payment between the two sets of results is very small (i.e., less than 1% variation) and 
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can be overlooked. The total demand reaches the highest amount of 750MW due to 
the generation capacity constraint. Market clearing price remains identical between 
the two sets of results. 
 
Table 5.2  
Comparison of case 1 scenario 2 with change of Q 


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








100 44 33 22 8889 5000 2222 30000 300 
200 89 67 44 17778 10000 4444 60000 300 
300 133 100 67 26667 15000 6667 90000 300 
400 178 133 89 35555 20000 8889 119999 300 
500 222 167 111 44444 25000 11111 149999 300 
600 250 207 143 52783 33380 15878 186679 311 
700 250 250 200 62501 50001 30002 245003 350 
750 250 250 250 75000 62500 50000 299999 400 
  


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








100 44 33 22 8889 5000 2222 30000 300 
200 89 67 44 17778 10000 4444 60000 300 
300 133 100 67 26667 15000 6667 90000 300 
400 178 133 89 35556 20000 8889 120000 300 
500 222 167 111 44444 25000 11111 150000 300 
600 250 207 143 52777 33372 15872 186691 311 
700 250 250 200 62500 50000 30000 245000 350 




5.4 Comparison of Case 1 Scenario 3 (change of total 
demand with generation and transmission capacity 
constraint) 
 
While comparing the results in the case with generation and transmission capacity 
constraints when total demand increases, the main difference appears in individual 
quantity, individual profit, load payment and market clearing price. The largest 
variation is found when total demand is beyond 700MW. For example, as shown in 
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Table 5.3, the net variation of GenCo1’s individual production and individual profit, 
load payment and market clearing price, at total demand of 700MW, are 3%, 4%, 1% 
and 8%, respectively. 
 
Table 5.3  
Comparison of case 1 scenario 3 with change of Q 


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








100 44 33 22 8889 5000 2222 30000 300 
200 89 67 44 17778 10000 4444 60000 300 
300 133 100 67 26667 15000 6667 90000 300 
400 178 133 89 35555 20000 8889 119999 300 
500 222 167 111 44444 25000 11111 149999 300 
600 250 207 143 52778 33373 15873 186667 311 
700 243 233 224 69013 54611 41144 268799 384 
735 235 250 250 78647 71105 58654 319405 435 
  


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








100 44 33 22 8889 5000 2222 30000 300 
200 89 67 44 17778 10000 4444 60000 300 
300 133 100 67 26667 15000 6667 90000 300 
400 178 133 89 35556 20000 8889 120000 300 
500 222 167 111 44444 25000 11111 150000 300 
600 250 207 143 52777 33372 15872 186691 311 
700 250 250 220 63759 54470 39694 267029 355 
735 250 250 250 75490 67814 60137 322665 402 
 
 
5.5 Comparison of Case 2 Scenario 1 (change of demand 
elasticity with no constraint) 
 
With the change of demand elasticity, the results from the analytical model and 
Plexos simulations also show a good match. There is no significant difference 
between the two sets of results. The only notable difference in individual profits, load 
payment and market clearing price, at the demand elasticity level of -1.2334, is less 




Table 5.4 shows that the results from analytical model and Plexos match perfectly. 
This proves that analytical models can be validated by the simulations results from 
Plexos. 
Table 5.4 
Comparison of case 2 scenario 1 with change of e 


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








-0.4334 220 200 180 120934 99933 80934 389800 650 
-0.5334 240 200 160 71984 49983 31984 239950 400 
-0.6334 260 200 140 56327 33326 16327 189978 317 
-0.7334 280 200 120 48997 24996 8997 164988 275 
-0.8334 300 200 100 44998 19997 4998 149992 250 
-0.9334 320 200 80 42665 16665 2665 139994 233 
-1.0334 340 200 60 41285 14284 1285 132853 221 
-1.1334 360 200 40 40500 12499 500 127497 212 
-1.2334 380 200 20 40111 11110 111 123331 206 
-1.3334 400 200 0 40000 9999 0 119998 200 
  


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








-0.4334 220 200 180 121000 100000 81000 390000 650 
-0.5334 240 200 160 72000 50000 32000 240000 400 
-0.6334 260 200 140 56377 33367 16357 190082 317 
-0.7334 280 200 120 49000 25000 9000 165000 275 
-0.8334 300 200 100 45000 20000 5000 150000 250 
-0.9334 320 200 80 42613 16633 2653 139903 233 
-1.0334 340 200 60 41339 14316 1294 133256 221 
-1.1334 360 200 40 40500 12500 500 127727 212
-1.2334 380 200 20 40066 11088 109 122920 205 
-1.3334 400 200 0 39998 9999 0 119999 200 
 
 
5.6 Comparison of Case 2 Scenario 2 (change of demand 
elasticity with generation capacity constraint) 
 
With the change in demand elasticity, the results of the comparison between the 
analytical model and the Plexos simulation are also well matched . The only minor 
difference is in individual profits and load payment while demand elasticity increases. 
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As shown in Table 5.5, the individual production and market clearing price remain 
identical between the results of the two sets during the change of demand elasticity. 
 
Table 5.5 
Comparison of case 2 scenario 2 with change of e 
 


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








-0.4334 220 200 180 120934 99933 80934 389800 650 
-0.5334 240 200 160 71984 49983 31984 239950 400 
-0.6334 250 204 146 56092 35623 18122 194622 324 
-0.7334 250 213 137 47637 29918 12418 174329 291 
-0.8334 250 221 129 42302 26395 8897 161525 269 
-0.9334 250 230 120 38633 24042 6543 152718 255 
-1.0334 250 239 111 35952 22380 4881 146286 244 
-1.1334 250 247 103 33908 21163 3664 141380 236 
-1.2334 250 250 100 32811 20311 3124 138747 231 
-1.3334 250 250 100 32143 19643 2858 137144 229 
  


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








-0.4334 220 200 180 121000 100000 81000 390000 650 
-0.5334 240 200 160 72000 50000 32000 240000 400 
-0.6334 250 204 146 56085 35612 18115 194676 324 
-0.7334 250 213 137 47634 29911 12413 174169 291 
-0.8334 250 221 129 42303 26396 8898 161592 269 
-0.9334 250 230 120 38631 24038 6541 152524 255 
-1.0334 250 239 112 35964 22403 4891 146310 244 
-1.1334 250 247 103 33906 21159 3663 141188 236 
-1.2334 250 250 100 32806 20306 3120 138827 231 
-1.3334 250 250 100 32144 19644 2858 136922 229 
 
 
In case 2 scenario 2, the results between the analytical model and Plexos show a good 
match. 
 
5.7 Comparison of case 2 scenario 3 with generation and 




With the change in demand elasticity, the difference between the two sets of results 
appears to increase when demand elasticity is beyond -0.8334. The largest variation in 
individual production is 14% for GenCo2 at demand elasticity of -1.2334 and -1.3334. 
GenCo3’s individual profit has the highest variation at 14% when demand elasticity 
reaches -1.2334. Load payment has 1% variation with demand elasticity at the values 
between -0.9334 to -1.33334. Market clearing price also varies between two to five 
percent when demand elasticity increase from -0.9334 to -1.3334. 
 
Table 5.6 
Comparison of case 2 scenario 3 with change of e 
 


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








-0.4334 220 200 180 120934 99933 80934 389800 650 
-0.5334 240 200 160 71984 49983 31984 239950 400 
-0.6334 250 204 146 56092 35623 18122 194622 324 
-0.7334 250 213 137 47637 29918 12418 174329 291 
-0.8334 250 220 130 42626 26472 9188 162301 271 
-0.9334 250 220 130 40149 24308 7891 156358 261 
-1.0334 250 220 130 38273 22673 6906 151855 253 
-1.1334 250 220 130 36824 21399 6151 148378 247 
-1.2334 250 220 130 35680 20375 5564 145632 243 
-1.3334 250 220 130 34729 19534 5071 143350 239 
  


















π 2 (MW) 
GenCo3 
profit 








-0.4334 220 200 180 121000 100000 81000 390000 650 
-0.5334 240 200 160 72000 50000 32000 240000 400 
-0.6334 250 204 146 56085 35612 18115 194676 324 
-0.7334 250 213 137 47634 29911 12413 174169 291 
-0.8334 250 222 129 42487 26595 9045 161895 270 
-0.9334 250 230 127 38887 24721 7469 155529 256 
-1.0334 250 239 125 36038 23301 6346 151019 244 
-1.1334 250 248 123 33871 22281 5459 147483 235 
-1.2334 250 250 121 32961 21447 4813 144431 232 









In this thesis, an Extended Cournot model has been developed. It is used to investigate 
the impact of demand elasticity on key market outputs during electricity market 
competition. 
 
The classical Cournot model focuses more on the supply side, which in most cases 
will lead to a mismatch between the supply and demand in the electricity market as 
the power suppliers will use the demand function to determine their outputs on the 
assumption that all suppliers behave in the same way simultaneously. Demand 
elasticity is proven to play a significant role in the system management especially 
during peak time, and its relationship with other market factors needs to be 
investigated further. The Extended Cournot model which includes demand elasticity 
and generation and transmission constraints has been proposed. This gives the load 
side more ability to influence the market results. By changing the demand elasticity, 
load can have certain influence on the market price, GenCos’ outputs and profits and 
load payment.  
 
As transmission constraint is not a necessary market condition to modeling Cournot 
competition, the unbundling of generation and transmission constraints can provide 
more scope for the Extended Cournot model to conduct investigations in different 
environments. The section with generation constraint has shown important findings 
on the evidence that, when demand elasticity is introduced and stays constant, market 
price is only going to change when the generation capacity limit of certain power 
producers reaches its maximum. This can in fact provide a signal to the system 
operator to assess the balance between electricity supply and demand. Necessary 
generation capacity expansion can then become an issue for planning and the market 
price can assist by providing an indication of the level of planning needed. However, 
when the planning is not feasible in the short term, demand response will help to 




In the classical Cournot model, power suppliers will ultimately determine the market 
price via choosing their production level. In certain circumstances, if a load demand 
already exists, there is a high possibility that the load demand will not be hundred 
percent satisfied. The results from the simulations show that increased demand 
elasticity will reduce load payment which reinforces the fact that demand should 
participate actively in the market in order to prevent abuse of market power.  
  
While the results on one hand show significant impact of demand elasticity on the 
market outputs, on the other hand, they also show that demand elasticity has a limited 
impact on the market outputs as the level of influence diminishes with the increase in 
demand elasticity. This is especially true when both generation and transmission 
constraints are implemented in the models.  
 
One of the major assumptions in the model is that the marginal cost is constant and 
known. Therefore, the results depend on the level of each GenCo’s marginal cost 
compared to the average cost.  
 
Simulation results from Plexos are compared with the ones from the developed 
Extended Cournot model. The preliminary results show agreement with the 
simulation results obtained using Plexos. There are some advantages and 
disadvantages to using both models. Plexos has the advantage that its model can be 
applied to larger networks. However, since it is based on the classic Cournot model, it 
cannot adequately handle transmission and generation constraints. The Extended 
Cournot model has the advantage of introducing demand elasticity in a simpler way 
by changing the input data, compared to the more complicated way in Plexos which 
needs to calculate the demand slopes for each bus first based on the total demand 
curve. During the data input process, loads need to be imposed on all buses although 
their values are set to be equal to zero. Another advantage of the Extended Cournot 





6.2 Recommendations  
 
The work in progress extends application of the Extended Cournot model to the 
following areas: 
 
1) Different level of marginal cost of the GenCos. 
 
One of the main assumptions of the Extended Cournot model is that the marginal 
cost of all power producers is fixed. The proportional difference between the 
marginal costs of the three power producers is the same. Therefore, it is 
recommended that the impact of a variable marginal cost on the market outputs 
be investigated. This may also provide the opportunity to use both quantity and 
price to identify the behaviors of power producers in any potential exercise of 
market power. 
 
2) Different level of generation capacities of the GenCos 
 
The assumption of the Extended Cournot model in the scenario with generation 
capacity constraint, is that the generation capacities of the three power producers 
are the same and constant. In future work, generation capacity can also become 
variable. As locational marginal pricing is adopted in this thesis, in a larger 
network it is possible to consider overall power supply in certain regions instead 
of each individual power producer’s supply.  
 
3) Different possibilities of transmission capacities and the network 
 
The transmission constraint introduced in scenario 3 is to place a transmission 
limit on line L1-3. The reason for this is to limit access to the load to the most 
economical power producer. In a lager network, this may not necessarily be the 
case. Load demand may have less access to any power producers that have lower 
bids/marginal cost. The choice of a simplified 3-bus network is that such a 




However, the Extended Cournot model can be applied to a larger and more 
complex network.   
 
Another application could be that the demand side involvement contribute to analysis 
in the electricity market such as smart grid as the information about the behaviors of 
both suppliers and consumers needs to be gathered and considered in order to improve 
the efficiency, reliability, economics, and sustainability of the production and 
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Appendix 1. Example of Plexos Excution Log file –  
   Case 1 Scenario 1: Change of total demand    
   (Q=100) with constant demand elasticity  
   (e= -0.6667) and without constraint  
 
 
Started Project NC (Model "NC-Q=100") --> 
- Using Metric Units 











Primary Compilation Completed. Time: 1.83 sec. 
Model Initialization Started --> 
- Random Number Seed = 560619933 (enter this number to repeat this sequence). 
Requesting licenses: 
- PLEXOS 4.914 R2 
- PLEXOS Base Product 
- MOSEK Base Product 
- MOSEK Parallel 
- MOSEK Dual Simplex 
- Machine Name: MACHINESLAB11 
- Physical Memory: 1,022.73 MB 
- CPU Type: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz 
- CPU Count: 2 
- Maximum Threads: 2 
- MOSEK 5.0.0.128 
Licenses received. 
Planning Horizon Set up Started 
Set up 1 Day(s). Time: 0.17 sec. 
Secondary Compilation Started: 
Secondary Compilation Completed. Time: 0.34 sec. 
In-Memory Cache Setup Started 
In-Memory Cache Setup. Time: 2.63 sec.: 
- 0 reallocations 
- 10000.00 kB 
- 0.00 % efficiency 
<-- Model Initialized. Time: 7.44 sec. 
Preschedule --> 




<-- Preschedule step 1 of 1. Time: 0:00:00 
 
Preschedule Completed. Time: 0:00:00 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setup........................................... 51.61 % 
Solution........................................ 0.00 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ST Schedule --> 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OPF Element Count 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Single Slack Bus........................................................."1" 
Nodes (busbars)............................................................3 
Nodes in Service...........................................................3 
Load Points................................................................0 
Generation Injection Points................................................3 
Total Injection Points.....................................................3 
Lines (branches)...........................................................3 
Lines in Service...........................................................3 
AC Lines...................................................................3 
Flow Limits >= 0 kV........................................................3 
Flows Modeled >= 0 kV......................................................3 
DC Lines...................................................................0 
Phase Shifters.............................................................0 
Phase Shifters in Service..................................................0 
Generators.................................................................3 
Generators in Service......................................................3 
Unique AC Paths............................................................3 
Modeled AC Paths...........................................................3 
Required PTDF..............................................................9 
Finished 3 Projections. Stored 6 PTDFs out of 9 (Compressed 33.33%). Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 1 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 AM 
Task Size: 
- Columns (variables): 26 
- Rows (constraints): 16 
- Non-zeros (coefficients): 54 
- Memory (MB estimated): 32.66 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 1 of 24. Time: 1.06 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 2 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
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(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 2 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 3 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 3 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 4 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 4 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 5 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 5 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 6 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 AM 
 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 6 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 7 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 7 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 8 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 8 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 9 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 




R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 9 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 10 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
 
Model ( NC-Q=100 ) Log 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 10 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 11 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 11 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 12 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 12 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 13 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 13 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 14 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 14 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 15 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 PM 
 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 15 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 16 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 




R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 16 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 17 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 17 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 18 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 18 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 19 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 19 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 20 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 20 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 21 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 21 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 22 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 22 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 23 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Completed ST Schedule Step 23 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 24 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 PM 
 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 100.00 100.00 0.00 13.89 30.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 24 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Regional Summary: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 2,400.00 2,400.00 0.00 333.33 720.00 0.00 $300.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ST Schedule Completed. Time: 0:00:02 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setup........................................... 22.49 % 
MOSEK:.......................................... 0.92 % 
Solution........................................ 13.49 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
<-- ST Schedule 
























Appendix 2. Example of Plexos Excution Log file –  
    Case 1 scenario 2: Change of total demand  
    (Q=750) with constant demand elasticity  
    (e= -0.6667) and with generation capacity  
    constraint  
 
 
Model ( NC-Q=750 ) Log 
Started Project NC (Model "NC-Q=750") --> 
- Using Metric Units 











Primary Compilation Completed. Time: 1.80 sec. 
Model Initialization Started --> 
- Random Number Seed = 770296122 (enter this number to repeat this sequence). 
Requesting licenses: 
- PLEXOS 4.914 R2 
- PLEXOS Base Product 
- MOSEK Base Product 
- MOSEK Parallel 
- MOSEK Dual Simplex 
- Machine Name: MACHINESLAB11 
- Physical Memory: 1,022.73 MB 
- CPU Type: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz 
- CPU Count: 2 
- Maximum Threads: 2 
- MOSEK 5.0.0.128 
Licenses received. 
Planning Horizon Set up Started 
Secondary Compilation Started: 
Secondary Compilation Completed. Time: 0.30 sec. 
In-Memory Cache Setup Started 
In-Memory Cache Setup. Time: 2.61 sec.: 
- 0 reallocations 
- 10000.00 kB 
- 0.00 % efficiency 
<-- Model Initialized. Time: 7.13 sec. 
Preschedule --> 
Preschedule step 1 of 1: Wednesday, January 01, 2014 - Wednesday, January 01, 2014 
--> 
<-- Preschedule step 1 of 1. Time: 0:00:00 
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Setup........................................... 100.00 % 
Solution........................................ 0.00 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ST Schedule --> 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OPF Element Count 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Single Slack Bus........................................................."1" 
Nodes (busbars)............................................................3 
Nodes in Service...........................................................3 
Load Points................................................................0 
Generation Injection Points................................................3 
Total Injection Points.....................................................3 
Lines (branches)...........................................................3 
Lines in Service...........................................................3 
AC Lines...................................................................3 
Flow Limits >= 0 kV........................................................3 
Flows Modeled >= 0 kV......................................................3 
DC Lines...................................................................0 
Phase Shifters.............................................................0 
Phase Shifters in Service..................................................0 
Generators.................................................................3 
Generators in Service......................................................3 
Unique AC Paths............................................................3 
Modeled AC Paths...........................................................3 
Required PTDF..............................................................9 
Finished 3 Projections. Stored 6 PTDFs out of 9 (Compressed 33.33%). Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 1 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 AM 
Task Size: 
- Columns (variables): 26 
- Rows (constraints): 16 
- Non-zeros (coefficients): 54 
- Memory (MB estimated): 32.66 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Completed ST Schedule Step 1 of 24. Time: 0.53 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 2 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 




R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 2 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 3 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 3 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 4 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 4 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 5 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 5 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 6 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 6 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 7 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 7 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 8 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 8 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 9 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Completed ST Schedule Step 9 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 10 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Completed ST Schedule Step 10 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 11 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 11 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 12 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 12 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 13 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 13 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 14 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 14 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 15 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 15 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 16 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Completed ST Schedule Step 16 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 17 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 17 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 18 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 18 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 19 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Completed ST Schedule Step 19 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 20 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 20 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 21 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 21 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 22 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 22 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 23 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 23 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 24 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 PM 
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Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 749.97 749.97 0.00 112.49 300.01 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 24 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Regional Summary: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(GWh) (GWh) (GWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 18.00 18.00 0.00 2,699.88 7,200.12 0.00 $400.02 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ST Schedule Completed. Time: 0:00:01 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setup........................................... 0.00 % 
MOSEK:.......................................... 6.85 % 
Solution........................................ 1.80 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Solution Tables Indexed. Time: 0.86 sec. 
<-- ST Schedule 

























Appendix 3. Example of Plexos Excution Log file –  
    Case 1 scenaior 3: change of total demand  
    (Q=700) with constant demand elasticity (e=  
    -0.6667) and with generation and transmission  
    capacity constraints  
 
Started Project NC (Model "NC-Q=700") --> 
- Using Metric Units 











Primary Compilation Completed. Time: 2.58 sec. 
Model Initialization Started --> 
- Random Number Seed = 1092358493 (enter this number to repeat this sequence). 
Requesting licenses: 
- PLEXOS 4.910 R2 
- PLEXOS Base Product 
- MOSEK Base Product 
- MOSEK Parallel 
- MOSEK Dual Simplex 
- Machine Name: JACKY 
- Physical Memory: 1.50 GB 
- CPU Type: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz 
- CPU Count: 2 
- Maximum Threads: 2 
- MOSEK 5.0.0.79 
Licenses received. 
Planning Horizon Set up Started 
Secondary Compilation Started: 
Secondary Compilation Completed. Time: 0.36 sec. 
In-Memory Cache Setup Started 
In-Memory Cache Setup. Time: 3.05 sec.: 
- 0 reallocations 
- 10000.00 kB 
- 0.00 % efficiency 
<-- Model Initialized. Time: 8.56 sec. 
Preschedule --> 
Preschedule step 1 of 1: Sunday, January 01, 2006 - Sunday, January 01, 2006 --> 
<-- Preschedule step 1 of 1. Time: 0:00:00 





Setup........................................... 86.24 % 
Solution........................................ 0.00 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ST Schedule --> 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OPF Element Count 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Single Slack Bus........................................................."1" 
Nodes (busbars)............................................................3 
Nodes in Service...........................................................3 
Load Points................................................................0 
Generation Injection Points................................................3 
Total Injection Points.....................................................3 
Lines (branches)...........................................................3 
Lines in Service...........................................................3 
AC Lines...................................................................3 
Flow Limits >= 0 kV........................................................3 
Flows Modeled >= 0 kV......................................................3 
DC Lines...................................................................0 
Phase Shifters.............................................................0 
Phase Shifters in Service..................................................0 
Generators.................................................................3 
Generators in Service......................................................3 
Unique AC Paths............................................................3 
Modeled AC Paths...........................................................3 
Required PTDF..............................................................9 
Finished 3 Projections. Stored 6 PTDFs out of 9 (Compressed 33.33%). Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 1 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 12:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 12:59:00 AM 
Task Size: 
- Columns (variables): 26 
- Rows (constraints): 16 
- Non-zeros (coefficients): 54 
- Memory (MB estimated): 32.66 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Class Name Flow (MW) Limit (MW) Loading 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Line "1-3"(1) 2.460703e+002 2.400000e+002 102.53 % 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 1 of 24. Time: 0.64 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 2 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 1:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 1:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
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(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 2 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 3 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 2:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 2:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 3 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 4 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 3:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 3:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 4 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 5 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 4:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 4:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 5 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
 
Started ST Schedule Step 6 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 5:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 5:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 6 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 7 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 6:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 6:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 7 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 8 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 7:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 7:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 8 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 9 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 8:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 8:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 




R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 9 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 10 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 9:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 9:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 10 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 11 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 10:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 10:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 11 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 12 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 11:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2006 11:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 12 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 13 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 12:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 12:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 13 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 14 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 1:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 1:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 14 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
 
Started ST Schedule Step 15 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 2:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 2:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 15 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 16 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 3:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 3:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Completed ST Schedule Step 16 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 17 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 4:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 4:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 17 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 18 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 5:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 5:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 18 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 19 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 6:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 6:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 19 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 20 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 7:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 7:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 20 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 21 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 8:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 8:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 21 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 22 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 9:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 9:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 22 of 24. Time: 0.01 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 23 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 10:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 10:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





Started ST Schedule Step 24 of 24: Jan 1, 2006 11:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2006 11:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 719.64 719.64 0.00 106.43 255.50 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 24 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Regional Summary: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(GWh) (GWh) (GWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 17.27 17.27 0.00 2,554.28 6,131.95 0.00 $355.03 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ST Schedule Completed. Time: 0:00:01 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setup........................................... 3.05 % 
MOSEK:.......................................... 9.12 % 
Solution........................................ 1.55 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
<-- ST Schedule 
























Appendix 4. Example of Plexos Excution Log file –  
    Case 2 scenario 1: change of demand elasticity  
   (e= -0.4334) with constant total demand – 
(Q=600)  
   and without constraint  
 
 
Started Project NC-Case1-change of elasticity (Model "e=-0.4334") --> 
- Using Metric Units 











Primary Compilation Completed. Time: 1.86 sec. 
Model Initialization Started --> 
- Random Number Seed = 566868342 (enter this number to repeat this sequence). 
Requesting licenses: 
- PLEXOS 4.914 R2 
- PLEXOS Base Product 
- MOSEK Base Product 
- MOSEK Parallel 
- MOSEK Dual Simplex 
- Machine Name: MACHINESLAB11 
- Physical Memory: 1,022.73 MB 
- CPU Type: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz 
- CPU Count: 2 
- Maximum Threads: 2 
- MOSEK 5.0.0.128 
Licenses received. 
Planning Horizon Set up Started 
Set up 1 Day(s). Time: 0.20 sec. 
Secondary Compilation Started: 
Secondary Compilation Completed. Time: 0.33 sec. 
In-Memory Cache Setup Started 
In-Memory Cache Setup. Time: 2.61 sec.: 
- 0 reallocations 
- 10000.00 kB 
- 0.00 % efficiency 
<-- Model Initialized. Time: 7.52 sec. 
Preschedule --> 
Preschedule step 1 of 1: Wednesday, January 01, 2014 - Wednesday, January 01, 2014 
--> 




Preschedule Completed. Time: 0:00:00 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setup........................................... 34.04 % 
Solution........................................ 0.00 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ST Schedule --> 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OPF Element Count 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Single Slack Bus........................................................."1" 
Nodes (busbars)............................................................3 
Nodes in Service...........................................................3 
Load Points................................................................0 
Generation Injection Points................................................3 
Total Injection Points.....................................................3 
Lines (branches)...........................................................3 
Lines in Service...........................................................3 
AC Lines...................................................................3 
Flow Limits >= 0 kV........................................................3 
Flows Modeled >= 0 kV......................................................3 
DC Lines...................................................................0 
Phase Shifters.............................................................0 
Phase Shifters in Service..................................................0 
Generators.................................................................3 
Generators in Service......................................................3 
Unique AC Paths............................................................3 
Modeled AC Paths...........................................................3 
Required PTDF..............................................................9 
Finished 3 Projections. Stored 6 PTDFs out of 9 (Compressed 33.33%). Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 1 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 AM 
Task Size: 
- Columns (variables): 26 
- Rows (constraints): 16 
- Non-zeros (coefficients): 54 
- Memory (MB estimated): 32.66 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 1 of 24. Time: 0.98 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 2 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 




R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 2 of 24. Time: 0.05 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 3 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 3 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 4 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 4 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 5 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 5 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 6 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 AM 
 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 6 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 7 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 7 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 8 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 8 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 9 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Completed ST Schedule Step 9 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 10 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 10 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 11 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 11 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 12 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 12 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 13 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 13 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 14 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 14 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 15 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 PM 
 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 15 of 24. Time: 0.01 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 16 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 16 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
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Started ST Schedule Step 17 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 17 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 18 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 18 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 19 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 19 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 20 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 20 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 21 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 21 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 22 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 22 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 23 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 23 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 




Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.00 600.00 0.00 88.00 390.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 24 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Regional Summary: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(GWh) (GWh) (GWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 14.40 14.40 0.00 2,112.00 9,360.00 0.00 $650.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ST Schedule Completed. Time: 0:00:02 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setup........................................... 21.28 % 
MOSEK:.......................................... 1.90 % 
Solution........................................ 14.88 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
<-- ST Schedule 



























Appendix 5. Example of Plexos Excution Log file –  
    Case 2 scenario 2: change of demand elasticity  
    (e= -1.334) with constant total demand – 
(Q=600)  
    and with generation capacity constraint  
 
 
Started Project NC (Model "e=-1.3334") --> 
- Using Metric Units 











Primary Compilation Completed. Time: 1.73 sec. 
Model Initialization Started --> 
- Random Number Seed = 1625828854 (enter this number to repeat this sequence). 
Requesting licenses: 
- PLEXOS 4.914 R2 
- PLEXOS Base Product 
- MOSEK Base Product 
- MOSEK Parallel 
- MOSEK Dual Simplex 
- Machine Name: MACHINESLAB11 
- Physical Memory: 1,022.73 MB 
- CPU Type: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz 
- CPU Count: 2 
- Maximum Threads: 2 
- MOSEK 5.0.0.128 
Licenses received. 
Planning Horizon Set up Started 
Secondary Compilation Started: 
Secondary Compilation Completed. Time: 0.30 sec. 
In-Memory Cache Setup Started 
In-Memory Cache Setup. Time: 2.55 sec.: 
- 0 reallocations 
- 10000.00 kB 
- 0.00 % efficiency 
<-- Model Initialized. Time: 6.91 sec. 
Preschedule --> 
Preschedule step 1 of 1: Wednesday, January 01, 2014 - Wednesday, January 01, 2014 
--> 
<-- Preschedule step 1 of 1. Time: 0:00:00 





Setup........................................... 100.00 % 
Solution........................................ 0.00 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ST Schedule --> 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OPF Element Count 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Single Slack Bus........................................................."1" 
Nodes (busbars)............................................................3 
Nodes in Service...........................................................3 
Load Points................................................................0 
Generation Injection Points................................................3 
Total Injection Points.....................................................3 
Lines (branches)...........................................................3 
Lines in Service...........................................................3 
AC Lines...................................................................3 
Flow Limits >= 0 kV........................................................3 
Flows Modeled >= 0 kV......................................................3 
DC Lines...................................................................0 
Phase Shifters.............................................................0 
Phase Shifters in Service..................................................0 
Generators.................................................................3 
Generators in Service......................................................3 
Unique AC Paths............................................................3 
Modeled AC Paths...........................................................3 
Required PTDF..............................................................9 
Finished 3 Projections. Stored 6 PTDFs out of 9 (Compressed 33.33%). Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 1 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 AM 
Task Size: 
- Columns (variables): 26 
- Rows (constraints): 16 
- Non-zeros (coefficients): 54 
- Memory (MB estimated): 32.66 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Completed ST Schedule Step 1 of 24. Time: 0.47 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 2 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Completed ST Schedule Step 2 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 3 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 3 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 4 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 4 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 5 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 5 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 6 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 6 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 7 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 7 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 8 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 8 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 9 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 9 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
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Started ST Schedule Step 10 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Completed ST Schedule Step 10 of 24. Time: 0.01 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 11 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 11 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 12 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 12 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 13 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 13 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 14 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 14 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 15 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 15 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 16 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 16 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 17 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 PM 
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Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 17 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 18 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 18 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 19 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Completed ST Schedule Step 19 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 20 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 20 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 21 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 21 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 22 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 22 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 23 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 23 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 24 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 PM 




(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 600.02 600.02 0.00 82.50 137.15 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 24 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Regional Summary: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(GWh) (GWh) (GWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 14.40 14.40 0.00 1,980.08 3,291.58 0.00 $228.58 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ST Schedule Completed. Time: 0:00:01 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setup........................................... 0.00 % 
MOSEK:.......................................... 5.68 % 
Solution........................................ 3.62 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Solution Tables Indexed. Time: 0.97 sec. 
<-- ST Schedule 



























Appendix 6. Example of Plexos Excution Log file –  
    Case 3 scenario 3: change of demand elasticity  
    (e= -1.2334) with constant total demand  
   (Q=600MW) and with generation and  
    transmission capacity constraints 
 
 
Started Project NC (Model "e=-1.2334") --> 
- Using Metric Units 











Primary Compilation Completed. Time: 1.78 sec. 
Model Initialization Started --> 
- Random Number Seed = 1166189730 (enter this number to repeat this sequence). 
Requesting licenses: 
- PLEXOS 4.914 R2 
- PLEXOS Base Product 
- MOSEK Base Product 
- MOSEK Parallel 
- MOSEK Dual Simplex 
- Machine Name: MACHINESLAB11 
- Physical Memory: 1,022.73 MB 
- CPU Type: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz 
- CPU Count: 2 
- Maximum Threads: 2 
- MOSEK 5.0.0.128 
Licenses received. 
Planning Horizon Set up Started 
Secondary Compilation Started: 
Secondary Compilation Completed. Time: 0.30 sec. 
In-Memory Cache Setup Started 
In-Memory Cache Setup. Time: 2.50 sec.: 
- 0 reallocations 
- 10000.00 kB 
- 0.00 % efficiency 
<-- Model Initialized. Time: 6.87 sec. 
Preschedule --> 
Preschedule step 1 of 1: Wednesday, January 01, 2014 - Wednesday, January 01, 2014 
--> 
<-- Preschedule step 1 of 1. Time: 0:00:00 





Setup........................................... 100.00 % 
Solution........................................ 0.00 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ST Schedule --> 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OPF Element Count 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Single Slack Bus........................................................."1" 
Nodes (busbars)............................................................3 
Nodes in Service...........................................................3 
Load Points................................................................0 
Generation Injection Points................................................3 
Total Injection Points.....................................................3 
Lines (branches)...........................................................3 
Lines in Service...........................................................3 
AC Lines...................................................................3 
Flow Limits >= 0 kV........................................................3 
Flows Modeled >= 0 kV......................................................3 
DC Lines...................................................................0 
Phase Shifters.............................................................0 
Phase Shifters in Service..................................................0 
Generators.................................................................3 
Generators in Service......................................................3 
Unique AC Paths............................................................3 
Modeled AC Paths...........................................................3 
Required PTDF..............................................................9 
Finished 3 Projections. Stored 6 PTDFs out of 9 (Compressed 33.33%). Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 1 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 AM 
Task Size: 
- Columns (variables): 26 
- Rows (constraints): 16 
- Non-zeros (coefficients): 54 
- Memory (MB estimated): 32.66 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Class Name Flow (MW) Limit (MW) Loading 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Line "1-3"(1) 2.446748e+002 2.400000e+002 101.95 % 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 1 of 24. Time: 0.45 sec. 
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Started ST Schedule Step 2 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 2 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 3 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 3 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 4 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 4 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 5 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Completed ST Schedule Step 5 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 6 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 6 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 7 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 7 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 8 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 8 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 9 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
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(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 9 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 10 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 10 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 11 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 11 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 12 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 AM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 AM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 12 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 13 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 12:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 12:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 13 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 14 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 1:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 1:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Completed ST Schedule Step 14 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 15 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 2:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 2:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 15 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 16 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 3:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 3:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 




R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 16 of 24. Time: 0.03 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 17 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 4:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 4:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 17 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 18 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 5:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 5:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 18 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 19 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 6:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 6:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 19 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 20 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 7:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 7:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 20 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 21 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 8:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 8:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 21 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 22 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 9:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 9:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 22 of 24. Time: 0.00 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 23 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 10:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 10:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





Completed ST Schedule Step 23 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Started ST Schedule Step 24 of 24: Jan 1, 2014 11:00:00 PM - Jan 1, 2014 11:59:00 PM 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 621.13 621.13 0.00 86.73 144.01 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Completed ST Schedule Step 24 of 24. Time: 0.02 sec. 
Regional Summary: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region/Area Demand Generation Net I/C Gen. Cost Load Cost USE Price 
(GWh) (GWh) (GWh) ($000's) ($000's) (MWh) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R 14.91 14.91 0.00 2,081.44 3,456.17 0.00 $231.85 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ST Schedule Completed. Time: 0:00:01 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setup........................................... 0.00 % 
MOSEK:.......................................... 9.72 % 
Solution........................................ 5.78 % 




Efficiency.................................... 0.00 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
<-- ST Schedule 






















Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3    
100 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
200 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
300 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
400 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
500 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
600 - - - 16.7 0 0 16.7 0 0 0 





























Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3  
-0.4334 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-0.5334 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-0.6334 - - - 11 0 0 11 0 0 0 
-0.7334 - - - 25.5 0 0 25.5 0 0 0 
-0.8334 - - - 34.6 0 0 31.9 0 0 5 
-0.9334 - - - 40.9 0 0 27.6 0 0 25 
-1.0334 - - - 45.5 0 0 24.4 0 0 40 
-1.1334 - - - 49 0 0 21.7 0 0 52 
-1.2334 - - - 53.1 3.1 0 19.4 0 0 62 
-1.3334 - - - 57.1 7.1 0 17.6 0 0 70 
 
 
